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Glossary of Terms 
 
Abbreviation Used Full term Brief explainer 
API Application Programming 
Interface 
Set of definitions, protocols 
and tools for building 
software on a platform 
B2B Business-to-Business Products or services sold to 
another company directly 
B2B2C Business-to-Business-to-
Customer 
Products or services sold to 
another company that uses it 
to sell a product or service to 
an end user 
B2C Business-to-Customer Products or services sold to 
its end user 
CDNaaS Content Distribution 
Network as-a-Service 
On-demand access to 
distributed networks and 
data centers 
C-RAN Cloud Radio Access 
Network 
RAN operated on a set of 
virtualized network 
resources 
eMBB enhanced Mobile Broadband The transfer of user data and 
messaging via mobile 
network, e.g. video 
streaming 
IL Instantiation Level Different quality iterations 
of the same network 
structure 
IoT Internet of Things Interconnected network of 
sensors 
mMTC massive Machine-Type 
Communication 
Related to IoT, ubiquitous 
connection of devices to the 
network 
MNO Mobile Network Operator Operate mobile broadband 
businesses and own 
spectrum, e.g. Telia, DNA 
or Elisa 
(V)NF (Virtual) network function NFV-driven functional 
building block within a 
network infrastructure, e.g. a 
network node 
NFV Network Function 
Virtualization 
Allows for network 
functions to be software-
driven and separate from 
physical hardware 
NS Network service Composition of network 
functions, with at least 1 
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VNF. Has a defined 
performance purpose in the 
network 
QoS Quality of Service Quantified measurement of 
the performance of a 
network, based on 
requirements 
RAN Radio Access Network Located between the core 
network and user devices, 
connects devices together 
SDN Software-defined 
networking 
Decouples the data and 
control plane, allowing for 
programmable networks 
SFC Service Function Chaining How ordered functions in a 
network are routed through 
different network services 
SFP Service Function Path Predefined logical paths of 
how SFC is implemented 
TOFaaS Traffic-Offloading as-a-
Service 
On-demand management of 
traffic loads on networks 
URLLC Ultra-Reliable, Low Latency 
Communication 
Mission critical or time 
critical services, e.g. 
autonomous vehicles 
vMEC Virtualized Multi-access 
Edge Computing 
Computational resources on 
the cloud that allow 
offloading of computation 
by users 
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Abstract 
 
In my thesis, I explore the design of a market mechanism to socially efficiently allocate 
resources for network slicing as-a-Service. Network slicing is a novel usage concept for the 
upcoming 5G network standard, allowing for isolated and customized virtual networks to 
operate upon a larger, physical 5G network. By providing network slices as-a-Service, where 
the users of the network slice do not own any of the underlying resources, a larger range of 
use cases can be catered to. 
My market mechanism is a novel amalgamation of existing mechanism design solutions from 
economics, and the nascent computer science literature into the technical aspects of network 
slicing and underlying network virtualization concepts. The existing literature in computer 
science is focused on the operative aspects of network slicing, while economics literature is 
incompatible with the unique problems network slicing poses as a market. In this thesis, I 
bring these two strands of literature together to create a functional allocation mechanism for 
the network slice market. 
I successfully create this market mechanism in my thesis, which is split into three phases. The 
first phase allows for bidder input into the network slices they bid for, overcoming a trade-off 
between market efficiency and tractability, making truthful valuation Bayes-Nash optimal. 
The second phase allocates resources to bidders based on a modified VCG mechanism that 
forms the multiple, non-identical resources of the market into packages that are based on 
bidder Quality of Service demands. Allocation is optimized to be socially efficient. The third 
phase re-allocates vacant resources of entitled network slices according to a Generalized 
Second-Price auction, while allowing for the return of resources to these entitled network 
slices without service interruption. As a whole, the mechanism is designed to optimize the 
allocation of resources as much as possible to those users that create the greatest value out of 
them, and successfully does so. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The 5G spectrum promises to change the way mobile networks are used: not only 
does it provide the performance gains that are being currently touted for new mobile 
broadband connections, but it also promises a broad level of improvements that are not 
limited simply to mobile phones. Rather, the larger evolution of 5G is likelier to be built upon 
the flexibility of the 5G standard, not only in its performance, but in the underlying 
technologies and concepts that can be realised under the spectrum. With the possibility of 
mass customization of networks through technological changes that we will talk about in our 
second section, two completely isolated networks can function using the same hardware but 
would have vastly different network services tied to them and could be used by different 
clientele entirely. This is called network slicing and is key to the way in which 5G will be 
operated in the future. Such mass customization means that 5G spectrum holders could 
generate more value out of their spectrum licenses through higher or more valuable traffic, 
without cannibalizing their own mobile broadband businesses. However, how would these 
network slices be created in a market with vastly different needs and private valuations by 
prospective network slices? This is what I will seek to answer in this thesis. 
 Gartner expects that network slicing will only appear in commercial usage after 2022 
(Keene, Fabre, & Takiishi, 2019), but there is no clear understanding on how this should 
happen: how should network slices be created and sold, how should the resources used to 
operate these networks be allocated? The current literature on the subject is still new, with the 
main focus in computer science literature on the operation of an individual network slice, 
sidestepping how they are formed. In my thesis, I focus on forming network slices in an as-a-
Service manner, with the users of network slices not owning the underlying resources, but 
rather using them only as a service. This allows for a broader range of usage cases, since the 
shared economies of scale will be far cheaper than a built-for-purpose network slice. Also, 
designing the network slices as services allows for competition between bidders, forming a 
price discovery mechanism. Thus, I try to provide a practical model to the theoretical work in 
academia so that network slicing as-a-Service can be developed further.  
The purpose of this thesis is to design an allocation and a re-allocation mechanism 
that, both combined, allocate the resources needed for network slices to the bidders in a 
socially optimal manner. I will seek to show that these network slices can be designed in an 
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as-a-Service manner, with an allocation phase that is both envy-free and Bayes-Nash 
incentive compatible for all participants and is understandable enough to be practically 
applicable. I will also provide a re-allocation mechanism that allows for statically allocated 
resources to be dynamically re-allocated when they are unused, thus creating a more efficient 
and welfare-maximizing system. This is a unique addition to the current literature, which 
currently only focuses on static allocation mechanisms. In all, I’m seeking to show that an as-
a-Service manner of designing network slicing markets would be both viable and socially 
efficient, thus the optimal way to operate the market. 
 The latest generation of mobile communication, the 5G standard, will possibly change 
the way mobile networks are utilized by businesses and consumers. The core aspect that 
makes 5G unique to other networking solutions or concepts is its flexibility to the demand 
that network users will have. The main design bodies have set up the following targets, 
compared to the previous generation (The Next Generation Mobile Networks Alliance, 
2015): 
• 1,000 X in mobile data volume per geographical area reaching a target of 0.75 Tb/s 
• 1,000 X in number of connected devices reaching a density ≥ 1M terminals/km² 
• 100 X in user data rate reaching a peak terminal data rate ≥1 Gb/s for cloud 
applications inside offices. 
• 1/10 X in energy consumption compared to 2010 while traffic is increasing 
dramatically at the same time. 
• 1/5 X in end-to-end latency reaching delays ≤ 5 ms. 
• 1/5 X in network management Operational Expenditure (OPEX). 
• 1/1,000 X in service deployment time reaching a complete deployment in ≤ 90 
minutes. 
• Guaranteed user data rate ≥ 50 Mb/s. 
• Capable of IoT terminals ≥ 1 trillion. 
• Service reliability ≥ 99.999% for specific mission critical services. 
• Mobility support at speed ≥ 500 km/h for ground transportation. 
• Accuracy of outdoor terminal location ≤ 1 m. 
Although the actual realized specifications that can be achieved on the new standard are 
unclear, it is sure that 5G will improve mobile communication in varied, specific ways. 
However, not all use cases will need to achieve all these milestones: guaranteeing haptic 
touch, being able to feel things remotely as if located there, in remote surgeries requires 
critical reliability and short latency, but low data volume is transferred. Meanwhile, video 
streaming has vastly different demands with a need of high data transfers rates. Thus, there is 
a desire to be very efficient with what performance your network needs, causing a desire for 
7 
 
high differentiation in network specifications. There are more examples in figure 1, where 
one can see how varied the demands can be within a single field or industry. Serving these 
different needs is possible through new technological solutions that enable the concept of 
network slicing. We will go through the technological aspects in section 2, but the value and 
challenge of network slicing can already be explained: building up tens of isolated individual 
networks within a larger network, each with a unique usage and structure, has tremendous 
value in enabling more varied technological solutions. This in turn would improve the social 
utility gain from 5G spectrum. 
However, this sets up a challenge on how the network resources should be allocated and 
how the license holders for 5G spectrum should price these assets. Each use case would have 
its own demand and valuation for the resources that make the capabilities possible, but we 
have no way of knowing ex-ante, what exactly each resource is worth to them, and therefore 
pricing the service accordingly. Since the packaging of resources is often heavily reliant on 
the business case of the bidder, the true value of the resources is based on information that is 
likely unavailable for the market orchestrator. 
 
Figure 1: Requirement structures of different use cases in  2 industries. Source: 
5G Empowering Vertical Industries, 5GPPP 
It will be hard to define what the specific use cases for 5G will be, as well as being 
beyond the framework of economics. Rather, the aim should be on creating a marketplace 
that allows the 5G spectrums to be used by various novel use cases, where we don’t know 
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what their demands will be beforehand. The market mechanism would thus need to 
incentivize use cases to share their demands, as well as allow the market to form the ideal 
combination of network resources to create the most valuable network slices, before dividing 
up the resources and collecting payments efficiently.  
In this paper, I will look at creating this network slice auction, built with a practical 
focus to be usable as a real-world market. This market would function through three stages: 
the first, a creation phase that collects the available resources and the bids that potential 
network slices offer for different capabilities. Second, an allocation phase that decides on 
who gets what and for what price. Third, a re-allocation phase that decides over time where 
excess resources, either newly added or unused by other network slices, are allocated. I will 
go through all these in section 4, with the comparative work on existing literature on the topic 
mainly handled in this section.  
This thesis is structured as follows: section 2 covers the technology that enables 
network slicing, section 3 will make a short literature review on the current solutions in the 
pre-5G world for competition and innovation trade-offs that I’m trying to resolve in this 
thesis. Section 4 will go through the three phases of the market mechanism explained earlier, 
with further literature review on the specific solutions my model is trying to utilize. Finally, 
section 5 will cover a discussion section on the implementation challenges and opportunities 
my mechanism might face. I finish off with a brief conclusion in section 6 on what I’ve 
found: it is possible to create network slices as-a-Service, and thus make the trade-offs to 
competition that currently exist with network operators less relevant to the future. This is 
done through an allocation phase based on a VCG mechanism and a re-allocation phase based 
on a Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction mechanism. 
2. Technological components of Network Slicing 
 
“5G is an end-to-end ecosystem to enable a fully mobile and connected 
society. It empowers value creation towards customers and partners, 
through existing and emerging use cases, delivered with consistent 
experience, and enabled by sustainable business models.”(The Next 
Generation Mobile Networks Alliance, 2015) 
 Before we can talk about the network slicing market, we need to understand the basics 
of the technology that enables it, and what exactly would be the product in our mechanism. 
5G can be roughly defined as a collection of new technological advances that have been 
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amalgamated into one standardized format with basic requirements, an effort by regulatory 
bodies, standardization organizations and industrial organizations (Morgado, Huq, Mumtaz, 
& Rodriguez, 2018). New software and hardware solutions allow for a wide array of 
functionalities to the 5G broadband, creating a need for a very flexible network architecture 
to satisfy all possible use cases. Rather than 5G being revolutionary in itself, it is the 
accompanying solutions that can change how mobile networks are utilised. 
5G is expected to have three broad design and architectural principles, covering the 
basic purposes that the technology can offer to users. Some use cases can require ability in 
more than one of these areas (see figure 1), which are usually called extensive Mobile 
Broadband (eMBB), massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC) and Ultra-reliable 
Low Latency Communication (URLLC). 
eMBB – This covers the standard purpose of mobile networks on the current generation, 
focused on providing high throughput of information between two devices or the network and 
a device, as well as high coverage and mobility support. 
mMTC – This covers the desire for cheap and ubiquitous connection of devices to the 
network, such as different Internet of Things or Industry 4.0 solutions. The focus here is on 
high density of devices, with long battery life and high position accuracy or reliability in 
some cases. 
URLLC – This covers the need for device connection that is both ultra-reliable (0.001% 
package drop rates) and has very low latency (<5ms connections). The focus here is on 
providing mission critical or time critical services the ability to connect as fast and securely 
as possible. 
 
Figure 2: Examples of the three broad areas and their use cases. Source: Gartner 
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In the next five sections, I will briefly look through different technologies that will 
enable the changing use cases involved with 5G. We obviously cannot go through every 
single tangential technological change involved in the 5G architecture, so I will rather 
concentrate on the ones with the highest impact, before talking about what sort of solutions 
these would allow. 
However, before we go into the technological aspects of network slicing, it would be 
valuable to preface it with the core economic changes that the technology will have, to prime 
you on the value of these concepts. The core driver of change is the virtualization of 
networks, since this changes how networks can be sold. This is made possible by the 
upcoming concepts. In the pre-5G world, networks were tied to physical resources, and thus 
the design of a network was pre-determined and fixed, since changes would require the 
addition of a physical mast or remote radiohead somewhere, for example. This would make 
the design of networks less responsive to demands, while also requiring those that might 
desire a network to build one themselves, since resources were more tied to a specific 
network topology. This also meant that the use cases were likely limited to mobile operators 
and companies that were large enough to make owning their own network viable. 
Virtualization allows for mobile networks to be less tied to physical resources, and 
therefore more customizable in its design and users. Since the owner of a mobile network 
could share a part of its resources to another user without affecting the structure of the 
network itself, called multi-tenancy, it has more options on maximizing its own revenue. A 
multi-tenant network is the logical consequence of trying to get the most out of your network, 
and it follows seeking to provide the network as a service to lower the cost barrier for smaller 
but possibly more lucrative bidders (Zhou, Li, Chen, & Zhang, 2016). There is no change of 
mindset in the world, rather a change in technological possibilities. Moreover, customization 
through a virtual network allows for the exact definition of the network slice to no longer be 
pre-defined. This means that anything could actually be provided as a service under this 
market, since the combination of resources is not restricted. This further opens up the market 
to a broader ranger of usage cases (Taleb, Ksentini, & Jäntti, 2016). To summarize, the 
technological changes incentivize the market to open up from being mainly between 
competing network and spectrum owners to those same owners offering their resources to 
other users that would use their network without owning or operating it. 
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2.1. Software Defined Networks (SDN) 
 
Akyildiz et al. (2015) give us a basic explanation what and how SDN differentiates 
from the current network technology. The main ideas are “(i) to separate the data plane 
(which carries user traffic) from the control plane (which plans the flow of traffic); and (ii) to 
introduce network control functionalities based on a virtualized network. These are achieved 
by (i) removing control decisions from the hardware, e.g. switches; (ii) enabling the hardware 
to be programmable through an open and standardized interface; (iii) using a network 
controller to define the behaviour and operation of the network forwarding infrastructure.” 
(Akyildiz, Lin, & Wang, 2015) This allows for a third party to control network resources, 
thus letting them control their own physical and virtual resources individually, giving them 
greater control of how their information is handled (Alexiadis & Shortall, 2017). 
By separating the control and data planes of a network, SDN allows for these two to 
be operated independently from each other, rather than being tied to the same hardware. We 
can see this in figure 3: each forwarding device in a traditional network has embedded 
controls and may have middleboxes too. In a software-defined network, these controls are 
decoupled, with a single software control operating this for all forwarding devices. Thus, we 
are able to create programmable networks, simplifying network management and allowing 
high network programmability (Nunes, Mendonca, Nguyen, Obraczka, & Turletti, 2014). 
This also allows for operational structure for network slicing, which we will talk about later. 
 
Figure 3: An explainer on SDN architecture logic. Source: Nunes et al. 2014 
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2.2. Network Functionality Virtualization (NFV) 
 
 Building on software-defined networks, Network Functionality Virtualization helps to 
abstract network functionalities and to implement these on software (Akyildiz et al., 2015). 
The NFV framework was originally developed and formalized by (ETSI GS NFV, 2013), 
creating a basic division of physical and vertical layers that has been used by later works. 
Mijumbi et al. (2015) gives us a comparative of NFV to the current way of network service 
provisioning: 
a. Decoupling software from hardware: As the network element is no longer a 
composition of integrated hardware and software entities, the evolution of both are 
independent of each other. This allows separate development timelines and 
maintenance for software and hardware.  
b. Flexible network function deployment: The detachment of software from hardware 
helps reassign and share the infrastructure resources, thus together, hardware and 
software, can perform different functions at various times. This helps network 
operators deploy new network services faster over the same physical platform. 
Therefore, components can be instantiated at any NFV-enabled device in the network 
and their connections can be set up in a flexible way 
c. Dynamic scaling: The decoupling of the functionality of the network function into 
instantiable software components provides greater flexibility to scale the actual virtual 
network function performance in a more dynamic way and with finer granularity, for 
instance, according to the actual traffic for which the network operator needs to 
provision capacity. (Mijumbi et al., 2015) 
So, rather than being reliant on specific and proprietary hardware to run, network 
functions can be migrated to the cloud, allowing for self-service in their operation (Morgado 
et al., 2018). The key effect of this technology on the utilisation of the 5G network would be 
the flexibility and control that a vertical, an operator in a specific industry or trade outside of 
the Mobile Network Operator’s own industry, can exercise on its own network usage. Rather 
than being tied to the Mobile Network Operator’s (MNO) proprietary hardware and software, 
it is able to import its own control mechanism and applications over to a new network. 
Moreover, NFV allows for general purpose servers, storage units and switches to be used on 
the physical level, which serve the new network based on the software that drives it (Han, 
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Gopalakrishnan, Ji, & Lee, 2015). This liberalizes their ability to choose how they utilize a 
network, as well as move between different MNOs. 
For a network as diverse in its applicability as 5G, the combination of SDN’s control 
independence and NFV’s ability to drive networks via software allows for a greater freedom 
to define the network in the way most useful for the individual use case. Combined, there is a 
greater ability to run network functions through cloud computing, rather than being reliant on 
physical hardware structures as networks currently are. Moreover, virtualization of the 
network allows for an easy and cost-efficient network isolation, since the isolation itself 
happens on a software level, rather than a hardware level. 
 
2.3. Virtualized Multi-access Edge Computing (vMEC) 
 
Although edge computing is not a new concept to 5G, it still plays a large part in 
explaining the flexibility possible on the platform. Mobile cloud computing as a general 
concept allows for a mobile device to offload its computation to the cloud, thus saving battery 
life, enabling more sophisticated applications to be run, and giving greater storage 
possibilities (Barbarossa, Sardellitti, & Di Lorenzo, 2014). However, utilizing the cloud can 
have high latency and high load on the radio access network due to the potentially distant 
location the cloud servers, both in terms of geographical and network topological distance. 
Edge computing seeks to bring this computation power closer, being distributed closer to the 
connected devices, thus straining the network less and providing a lower latency (Mach & 
Becvar, 2017). 
In the context of creating network slices, edge computing resources are useful to 
many applications, and vital for a few, meaning that they will be a highly valued but scarce 
resource. Moreover, their geographic location will be highly strategic and value-defining, 
since they will only be useful to network slices if they bring latency down through proximity 
to the intended users. Thus, location requirements will be a critical part of slice design, and 
the pricing of these resources will have high fluctuation from one edge resource to another. 
We will thus look into the location of the resources within our market mechanism. 
Edge resources allow for a network to improve its service in two broad areas: either 
by using computation resources to ease the load on a device, or from using storage capacity 
in strategic locations for content delivery. For the first, (Taleb et al., 2017) provides examples 
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on how computation can be offloaded, where a mobile device transfers a computation-
intensive task to an edge cloud to compute, such as the encoding of data in a video 
conference call. This also allows for faster decision-making by devices that are not well-
equipped to deal with the computation efforts, such as small cell networks (Intel, 2013) and 
by mMTC devices to provide memory replications to the central cloud (Abdelwahab, 
Hamdaoui, Guizani, & Znati, 2016). By allowing for computation to be externalized from the 
user device itself, networks can have more creativity in terms of how it operates its services. 
Since computation isn’t only tied to device that seeks it, more services can be provided to 
users than before. 
The other example use case (Taleb et al., 2017) focuses on is the use of edge storage 
resources to create caches of content closer to the users that need it. The basic example of this 
is video streaming, where content is stored closer to the users, so that the network doesn’t 
need to seek this data from a central cloud storage. Taleb et al. say this helps limit the 
“jittering” of a network through a faster and more secure latency. By not forcing devices to 
seek content from the central cloud, MEC helps reduce the load on the core network, 
reducing backhaul requirements for the network by 35% (Intel, 2013). Another example of 
content caching can be found in multiplayer gaming, with the stored data allowing for lower 
latency between the players. In these caching examples, location again is key, and thus will 
be a critical part of the re-allocation we’ll talk about in section 4.4. 
2.4. Network Slicing 
 
 Now, we’ll look into how these three technologies combine to allow for network 
slicing to be done, as well as explaining the mechanics and the value of network slices. The 
core value of a network slice is allowing tenants to reap the benefits of better performance 
and lower cost from sharing resources, while retaining control of the data and the operations 
of your own network (Caballero, Banchs, Veciana, Costa-Pérez, & Azcorra, 2018). (Nakao et 
al., 2017) define a slice as “an isolated set of programmable resources to implement network 
functions and application services through software programs”, which allows for separate sets 
of network functions to be run congruent to each other on the same network spectrum. To 
create a network slice, user demands are developed into Quality of Service (QoS)1 
                                                 
1 Quality of service is the end-to-end performance of the network that is affected by both the network and non-
network performance of the components that create the service. The definition of QoS is done on quantifiable 
and measurable terms, e.g. bit error rate, latency, repair time or performance provision time (ITU-T, 2008). 
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requirements based on software defined networking. SDN generates a logical network that 
optimizes how the virtualized radio resources are managed, drawing from edge nodes and 
centralized core network resources, depending on the needs of the network (Zhang et al., 
2017). Thus, we can create a network that is tailored directly to the needs of its user, giving it 
access to only the resources it needs, while keeping their network isolated from the activities 
of other network users. 
 In figure 4, you can see the proposed NFV architectural framework that network 
slices would function on (ETSI GS NFV, 2013). Here, we have physical hardware resources 
that are chosen for the slice, which are then virtualized to create virtual machines (VMs) that 
can be used by any network slice within the greater network. The VMs are then used in 
different amounts to create a virtualized network function (VNF), which the slice itself uses 
to generate the services required from it, based on the stipulated QoS. Simplified, these VNFs 
are blocks of resources that serve to generate a less abstract service, such as acting as a switch 
or router, which are usually called network services (NSs). Each network slice is likely to 
need a different combination of VNFs to generate the one or more network services that the 
network should provide, and thus most slices are going to be utilizing a different combination 
of the shared hardware resources. We’ll look further into these combinations in section 4.2.2. 
 Each network would also have a management and orchestration (MANO) plane to it, 
handling how the resources and VNFs are utilized. Part of the isolation concept of network 
slicing is that each slice has its MANO plane, orchestrating how the resource it is provided 
get used within its own network. This includes the virtual infrastructure manager (VIM), that 
manages how the resources are used, the VNF manager, that controls how the NSs are 
generated, and the NFV orchestrator, that orchestrates the virtualized section of the slice.  
The NFVO is then in contact one level upwards in the network slice, to the operations 
support system, which contains the slice controller. This section instantiates the slice itself, 
and creates it as part of the greater network it is in (Chatras, Tsang Kwong, & Bihannic, 
2017). The slice orchestrators of different slices within the network would then be in contact 
with the network manager of the whole network itself, in order to seek the resources that its 
network services would need. Sometimes called multi-tenancy, this system of multiple 
network slices within the network would require the complex orchestration of all resources to 
maximize efficiency and the QoS available to all slices (Samdanis, Costa-Perez, & 
Sciancalepore, 2016). 
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Figure 4: NFV architectural framework. Source: ETSI, 2013  
  
2.5. Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RAN) 
 
 The next thing we consider on the application of these technologies and solutions is 
the virtualization and moving to the cloud of the radio access networks (RAN), the data 
transfer network that connects devices to the core network. As (Ksentini & Nikaein, 2017) 
describe it, using SDN principles allows us to create a fully programmable network slice with 
a programmable RAN. This is done through the same principles talked about earlier: 
separating the control and data plane of the information going through the radio access 
network. What this means in practice is separating the physical remote radio heads (RRHs) 
that receive and transmit signals from the baseband units (BBUs) that process and direct the 
traffic. This would allow lower latency between RAN units, as the BBUs would now be 
pooled together, thus closer to the units they’d need to communicate with (Bhamare, Erbad, 
Jain, Zolanvari, & Samaka, 2018). Ksentini and Nikaein suggest using a Slice ID to direct the 
traffic through the pooled RAN resources to the right slice, from the user device to the core 
network, which would be encoded into the device, e.g. a SIM card (Zhou et al., 2016). 
 A critical thing for our mechanism is that it is yet unclear to what degree C-RAN will 
be implemented, i.e. how much of the transfer network will be virtualized or kept on their 
physical level, and which specific functionalities will be concerned. (Marsch et al., 2016) 
suggest that functions that are time-asynchronous (functions that don’t need to occur at the 
same time) are likelier to be implemented virtually, while time-synchronous functions would 
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still be physical. However, this is hard to decide beforehand, simply based on the needs of 
potential network slices being varied. This changes the input of the resources into our auction 
that potential network slices will compete for, especially as the market is continued from its 
initial allocation. Virtualized resources allow for dynamic scaling, allowing generic devices 
to be connected to the hardware pool, meaning that these resources can be added swiftly to 
respond to increased demand. Meanwhile, non-virtualized resources are more costly and 
slower to add into the network. Thus, the orchestrator of the market must be able to 
differentiate between the two, no matter how the radio access network is designed for the 
network slices. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
I will look into existing literature on network slicing -specific topics throughout the 
following sections, but I will do a brief literature review into how competition was regulated 
and operated before network slicing, since it is a separate consideration from the rest of the 
thesis. Pre-5G and early 5G literature studying the role of innovation and competition of 
mobile network infrastructure and telecommunications focused heavily on the investment 
incentives and access pricing2 imposed on incumbents. At its core, there was an implicit 
trade-off between the incentive for legacy incumbents to invest into the next generation 
technology and the ability of new entrants to compete in the market, creating a balance of 
social welfare between old and new technologies (Bourreau, Cambini, & Doǧan, 2012). 
There was a big problem of enforcing competition on an investment-heavy industry due to 
ex-ante threat of regulation: the incumbent feared enforced access pricing that opened 
competition in only its profitable areas (Kotakorpi, 2006), and also causing unwillingness to 
invest into unprofitable areas (Bourreau, Cambini, & Hoernig, 2012) and a fear of investment 
spillover benefiting competing entrants (Foros, 2004). There was also a lot of focus on the 
best way to enable market entry (Brito, Pereira, & Vareda, 2010; Brito & Tselekounis, 2016; 
Lestage & Flacher, 2014) and the value of higher competition into the telecommunications 
market (Houngbonon & Jeanjean, 2016; Jeanjean & Houngbonon, 2017; Vogelsang, 2017). 
                                                 
2 Access pricing is the concept of enforced access at a fixed price to the network of the incumbent for an entrant 
business, creating competition to the incumbent on their own network without new investment. This has been 
one of the standard competition mechanism pre-5G. To read more on this subject, see (Economides & White, 
1995; Pindyck, 2005). 
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The concerns that come along with 5G have moved on from this core trade-off: the 
value addition for MNOs that happens through network slicing comes from attracting new 
users to their mobile network. Assuming that the incumbent MNOs don’t have an interest in 
entering emergin vertical markets, narrow markets that meet specific needs for a targeted 
customer base, the MNOs aren’t inhibited to make investments into their network. Since the 
verticals utilizing network slices are likely to have little to no effect on the mobile broadband 
business of MNOs, eMBB explained in section 2, there’s little harm from these slices on their 
own profits. What Zhou et al. (2016) calls network slicing as-a-service (NSaaS) is going to be 
a key driver of how networks will used in the versatility of 5G. Rather than just creating 
network slices for their own business portfolio, MNOs would seek to provide different 
business verticals a network platform on which they can run their own businesses. 
There is a big question regarding how the 5G solution will develop the mobile 
network business: whether into a “business-as-usual” model of mobile broadband -driven 
network slice utilization called the “evolutionary” image, or whether it’ll be a more 
“revolutionary” image, with a broader demand for and competition of network slices (Cave, 
2018). Under the evolutionary vision, network slicing will be used to mainly drive cost-
effectiveness to offset rising network deployment cost3 on internal markets, while the 
revolutionary vision would lead this being used into external markets with currently untapped 
demand (Lemstra, 2018). The core value of a NSaaS paradigm will be a shift of focus from 
Business-to-customer (B2C) to B2B and B2B2C utilizations of licensed network, allowing 
MNOs to expand their revenue stream and broaden the firms able to benefit from dedicated 
network services (Zhou et al., 2016). 
There has been a lot of work put into the optimal allocation of virtualized resources in 
a network slice (Leivadeas, Falkner, Lambadaris, & Kesidis, 2017; Pianese, Gallo, Conte, & 
Perino, 2016; Tadayon & Aissa, 2018; Tang et al., 2018), where the core idea has been on 
finding the most efficient routing and combination of resources. This work goes beyond my 
thesis, since this intra-actor decision-making on which user gets which resources would be 
beyond the orchestrator of the auction, but it is good to know what the desired inputs would 
approximately be to estimate resource demand. Moreover, these papers do not answer the 
more fundamental question I am posing in this thesis: which bidders or network users should 
                                                 
3 Since the transition from 4G (LTE) to 5G would mean that the spectrum used will move from the 2,1GHz band 
to the 3,6GHz band (the NR-78 band), there would need to be a densification of the cell tower network. The 
core trade-off of spectrum is higher throughput for a narrower coverage per tower, when increasing in 
frequency. For more on network densification, see (Bhushan et al., 2014; Oughton & Frias, 2018). 
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be receiving these resources in the first place? Intra-network efficiency is a later phase 
question that requires an understanding of how the network slices are formed. Thus, this 
paper attempts to resolve the trade-offs that regulators have faced in the past in foster 
competition in a natural monopoly like network spectrum through a mechanism that allows 
for competition, without cannibalizing the business of license holders. 
4. Market Setup 
 
4.1. Market Structure 
 
 In this section, we will look at how an NSaaS market mechanism would be operated, 
in order to gauge the plausibility and value of creating network slices. Our market would be 
executed in three stages: a creation phase that allows for bidders and sellers to understand the 
market and for the orchestrator to build up the market based on demands. Next, the allocation 
creates network slices on minimum instantiation levels of their desired networks, which are 
individually developed based on the bidder’s demands. Finally, the re-allocation phase 
dynamically re-allocates resources that are not currently in use by other entitled network 
slices, once the network slices are fully in operation. In this market, there are inputs in the 
form of network, storage and computation resources, the sellers of these resources and the 
firms competing for resources with their own demands. Crucially, the market also needs an 
orchestrator, who forms prospective network slices to bidders and allocates resources to them 
by maximizing valuations, charging the prices agreed on from these buyers.  
There is some consensus in papers on the topic of network slice or radio resource 
allocation that the orchestrator of the market should be neutral and independent towards both 
the sellers and buyers (Jiang, Condoluci, Mahmoodi, & Guijarro, 2017; Ordonez-Lucena et 
al., 2018; Tadayon & Aissa, 2018). With a neutral orchestrator, competitors on both sides can 
be sure that their offered resources or their valuation is not being twisted or skewed by the 
orchestrator, thus creating risk that would need to be compensated for. For an MNO to run 
the market for itself, this would both limit the ability for the bidder to compare between 
MNOs on other network resources without rival markets, as well as causing bidders 
uncertainty of their bid being treated neutrally. Critically, the problem in non-neutrality is 
private information that the bidders would not want to share with the MNO, fearing 
20 
 
dishonesty in the mechanism and that their bid would signify their preferences or type 
(Myerson, 1983). 
In what we seek to resolve in this paper, a market mechanism that allocates and prices 
the resources to bidding network slices, there is no definite answers in literature to the two 
questions that are outstanding on it: how do we define the inputs that the bidders want, and 
how do we allocate resources efficiently? On the former question, there’s a challenge of 
creating accurate representations of the resources, while making it understandable to the 
bidder. Firstly, should the service description a bidder requests be human-readable or 
function- and network component-focused. Secondly, should the resources be coarsely- or 
finely-grained, in terms of the detail given (Foukas, Patounas, Elmokashfi, & Marina, 2017). 
A created allocation model suggested creating network chunks of each resources, which 
bidders can bid for separately (Jiang et al., 2017). Another solution provided is to create 
network services out of the virtual resources, thus having units of performance that are 
understandable enough for the bidder, while not reducing the efficiency of the resource 
combination too much (Ordonez-Lucena et al., 2018). The trade-off involved is thus the 
accuracy and efficiency of the network slices that can be created, and how understandable the 
market is for the bidders. 
On the latter question, how we intend to allocate the resources, it is critical to 
understand how the resources are put up for sale: since bidders aren’t seeking to gain 
resources, but rather to execute desired services, they will only be satisfied by a specified 
combination of resources. Thus, models where bidders bid for individual resources separately 
(Jiang et al., 2017) face the problem of conditional value: edge computing resources only 
have value if they’re also guaranteed a RAN solution to transfer data across. An opposite 
solution, pre-packaging all resources into blocks to be bid on would remove conditionality as 
a problem, but would require pre-planning and knowledge of bidders’ needs. Pre-packaging 
would require knowledge that the orchestrator cannot hold, since this is private information 
that the bidders themselves have. Designing packages based on lobbying suggestions would 
lead to mismatched packages skewed in favour of wealthier bidders, limiting efficient 
allocation. This would likely lock development out of the packages, or at least make this 
development driven by those within the network already. Thus, we have a trade-off between 
the resources being conditional to each other to form a bundle, and the efficiency of the 
resources being allocated. We will seek to solve this in the creation phase -section. 
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 Next, we’ll want to look into the resources on offer on the market, what would they 
be, how would they be differentiated from each other, as well as who would be providing 
them. The neutral orchestrator we envision would allow free entry of resources into the 
market, thus limiting the ability for any anti-competitive behaviour from incumbents. Before 
the pricing and allocation takes place, each resource provider would provide a set of 
resources and their quantities on offer to the orchestrator, as well as a minimum price with 
which they are willing to provide it. Pre-allocating the resources to the market is necessary to 
allow the resources to be connected to the network itself, making the creation phase of the 
network slices efficient. Moreover, each resource should have an exact geographical location 
provided with it, with the value of the resource being sometimes tied strongly to the where 
it’s located. Finally, each resource must have an API tied to it, so that it can be easily 
integrated to the bidder (Taleb et al., 2016). 
IoT service providers are likely to be pushing the market on edge computing, so 
creating the computation resources that are heavily location and proximity dependent (Hsieh, 
Chen, & Benslimane, 2018). Since this is likely to be a market driven by both price and 
connection security, the edge computing providers are likelier to be firms that provide such 
services outside telecommunications, rather than requiring industry-specific knowledge. On 
the same vein, core computing and storage functions, cloud functions that don’t have high 
proximity demands, are most likely going to be provided by firms with high economies of 
scale. Moreover, this section of input is likely to be highly commodified, purely by the 
simplicity and ubiquity of the service provided. A second edge resource to be used are 
content distribution networks (CDNs), which provide storage of content on the edge of the 
network to provide lower latency and more reliability to the user, as well as making transfer 
of data on the backbone network less necessary (Cave, 2018). With 77 percent of network 
traffic being forecast to cross CDNs, these edge resources will be valuable (Cisco, 2017). 
The telecommunications firms are in the greatest likelihood going to be providing two 
main input into the market, the spectrum the slice uses and the C-RAN and RAN resources 
the slice needs, along with controlling the creation of the network slices themselves for the 
bidder. Assuming that the upcoming 3,6GHz and 700MHz band auctions are going to follow 
the same pattern as the concluded rounds of auctions in e.g. Italy, Finland and the UK, most 
licensed spectrum is going to be picked up by telecommunications operators that have legacy 
network resources and spectrum from 4G and 3G operations. Thus, these legacy network 
owners are also likeliest to hold a cost advantage in bundling these services together, along 
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with being unlikely to freely provide outside access to their own licensed spectrum. An 
alternative spectrum that can be used is unlicensed spectrum like TV white spaces4 or 
licensed shared access (LSA) spectrum5. LSA spectrum requires the MNO to agree to sharing 
its spectrum with a third party, and they would likely prefer to do this under their own 
network slice, where they would retain greater control of the resource and would not compete 
against their other slices. While white spaces can be utilized in spectrums that MNOs cannot 
control or deny access to, their temporary nature means that QoS cannot be guaranteed on 
them, rendering them problematic for network slicing purposes. Thus, spectrum is likely to 
drive the usage of RAN resources, both from value of the routing power spectrum gives, and 
the bundling MNOs practice. 
Next, let’s delve into the creation of the network slice itself: what it entails and what 
value and control this gives the MNO. To do this, the service function chaining (SFC) 
architecture of the network slice must be created, which is the instantiation of an ordered set 
of functions that steers the traffic from end to end of the network (Halpern & Pignataro, 
2015). This SFC architecture would be based on the demand description of the network slice, 
along with all the network services implemented within it. Under SDN principles, the logical 
and network topology path are separate within the network slice. The SFC will likely be 
pathed in a dynamic routing, which allows the pathing to happen without a predetermined 
topology, thus allowing for a more responsive network to VNF congestion, link failure and 
any changes to the network services provided (Choyi, Abdel-hamid, Shah, Ferdi, & 
Brusilovsky, 2016; Medhat et al., 2017). This sort of a dynamic planning would require a 
more complex knowledge of the entire network, not just the services that are being chained 
together, and thus is best served by the MNO itself. For the market to work as intended, with 
limited lock-in cost for the network slices on the MNO providing them the network 
connection, it is key for open access API to be developed that allow the movement of tenants 
between different MNOs with minimal cost (Lemstra, 2018). 
A critical thing for the potential network slices is the need for all auctioned inputs to 
be understandable in both their quantity and quality; if they win, what exactly are they 
getting? Here, the so-called “Kelly’s mechanism” can be very useful, which aims for fairness 
with the weighted proportional fairness criterion (Afèche, 2006, p. 110): allocation of 
                                                 
4 The usage of TV frequencies that are not used in certain areas by unlicensed low-power devices, such as IoT 
devices. (Morgado et al., 2018) 
5 Exclusive access granted by a spectrum owner to secondary users on bandwidths that are underutilized, 
designed under a QoS agreement. (Marsden & Ihle, 2018) 
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resources should match to the valuation of each bidder (Kelly, Maulloo, & Tan, 1998). With 
different combinations of resources, this might not be always possible to gauge, although the 
principle stands in more limited and comparative circumstances. A fair allocation would also 
ensure an envy-free system: no actor in the market would rather have the package that 
another actor received for the amount they paid for. The market must also be simple enough 
that this envy-freeness is comprehensible to all buyers in the market. 
4.2. Creation Phase 
 
 In the creation phase, the orchestrator seeks to bring in the bids from the potential 
slices, what network services they are seeking, and the offerings from the resource providers, 
what they are willing to provide for the market. The market is created during the creation 
phase, allowing both sides to indicate what they are seeking, without having to share this 
information with their competitors for the resources and the sellers with the resources. Thus, 
a loss in the market doesn’t cause a loss of information to others, which would increase the 
hazard rate of the bidder, changing their behaviour in the market (Tadayon & Aissa, 2018). 
This highlights another reason for a neutral orchestrator: that the information of bids or 
offerings does not affect the behaviour of the other side of the market, thus not necessitating 
any ex-ante strategic behaviour. 
 The information on the network slice demand is asymmetrical in the market: the 
buyers have an understanding what they seek from the market, and the sellers can only 
anticipate this with what they seek to offer. Therefore, the decision-making on what sorts of 
network services are formulated from the available resources should come from the buyers, 
since they’ll only share this information through a purchasing decision. However, they have a 
worse understanding on what exactly they need on a technical level, i.e. what resources in 
what network services are needed to create the network slice that they desire. The generation 
of a clear network service catalogue by the orchestrator for the bidders is therefore crucial: 
providing both an understanding of what each network service provides, and what they need 
to be combined with to function. Since these network services would likely combine 
resources from multiple sellers, the design of the would be pre-set before the bids are placed, 
but the creation of the network services themselves would happen after the resource 
allocation phase. This allows for the geographical and temporal customization of the network 
service for the slice, since the information of the desired combinations are not available prior 
to the bids. 
24 
 
 In the next three subsections, I will look at how the creation phase will happen in 
effect, and how the different actors will behave and interact under my mechanism. To help 
understand the interactions between the actors and the order of action during the phase, see 
figure 5. First, sellers provide resources to create the marketplace of the mechanism, after 
which the orchestrator creates and allocates resources to network slices. Once the network 
slices are operational, the seller and bidder interact through the resources being made 
available to the bidder by the seller. Since the bidder behaviour in the market define the 
actions of the sellers, I will first go through the second phase mentioned, before going 
chronologically to look at the sellers’ interactions with the orchestrator and bidders 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5: Interactions and action order between the market’s three actors  
4.2.1. Bidder Strategy 
 
Our first focus will be on the stage 2 from figure 5, the interaction between the bidder 
and orchestrator. Specifically, we will look at how the bidder interacts with the network slices 
that the orchestrator creates for them. The bidder seeks the creation of a network slice, and 
we will follow the basic creation phase outlined by Ordonez-Lucena et al. (Ordonez-Lucena 
et al., 2018). The bidder has a set of performance demands for a network slice (e.g. wants 
their network slice to perform certain end user services at a certain quality), which it provides 
to the orchestrator. These demands are not formatted based on the resources it would need, 
only on the outcomes they would want to gain from the slice. The orchestrator uses these 
demands to form the ideal network structure, which would generate a resource-linked quality 
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of service (QoS)6 for bidder 𝑖, 𝑄𝑖. For the purposes of this thesis, we will assume that the 
network slice generated by the orchestrator is the best-effort ideal solution for the bidder 
needs, and the bidder takes this quality of service as a metric for its own services. Thus, they 
will base their decisions on valuations from here on based on this quality of service. 
To understand the creation of quality of service better, we can think of it as perfectly 
complementary isoquant lines of two network services, 𝑦1 and 𝑦2, which can be thought of as 
the switches and routers a network needs to function (see figure 6). In reality, a network slice 
will likely have more than two network services, but this allows us to conceptualize the QoS 
of a network slice with these isoquants. The problem illustrated would exist in a multi-
dimensional space as well. Critically, adding more computational resources to a network slice 
that does not have enough bandwidth to operate has no value, and vice versa. Although the 
isoquant form might not always be perfectly complementary, as presented, this core demand 
for enough resources to be operative is key.  
A network slice needs a minimal level of each resource or network service to be 
functional, i.e. to reach the lowest isoquant, or the minimal instantiation level (𝐼𝐿0) in our 
case. The concept of 𝐼𝐿0 is key throughout my thesis: the orchestrator ties a bidder’s 𝑄𝑖 to 
their minimal instantiation level, the required combination of resources to guarantee the 
bidder the service they demand. The bidder has valuations for each instantiation level, 
conditional on these resource demands, but the orchestrator is seeking to only meet the 
minimum demands in the allocation phase, thus only caring about the minimal instantiation 
level. If this minimal instantiation level of all resources or network services is not reached, 
the network slice is not operational, and thus has no value to the bidder. So, while the bidder 
mainly cares about the QoS service that is guaranteed to their network slice, 𝑄𝑖, the 
orchestrator and the seller cares about the minimal instantiation level, 𝐼𝐿0, required to satisfy 
these demands. 
                                                 
6 Quality of service is the end-to-end performance of the network that is affected by both the network and non-
network performance of the components that create the service. The definition of QoS is done on quantifiable 
and measurable terms, e.g. bit error rate, latency, repair time or performance provision time (ITU-T, 2008). 
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Figure 6: Isoquants of a simple network slice with two network services, 𝑦1 and 
𝑦2, creating a level of QoS at different instantiation levels  
The demand for the network services provided through our mechanism doesn’t appear 
out of nowhere, but rather comes from either a growth in customer willingness-to-pay or 
through an expansion or efficiency gain in the B2B-offerings a company has. As mentioned 
in the introduction, network slicing causes a paradigm shift in spectrum usage from B2C to 
B2B and B2B2C paradigms, meaning the end users are not directly connected to a Mobile 
Network Operator (MNO) (Zhou et al., 2016). 
The total utility, 𝜋𝑖, gained for each network slice, 𝑖, is driven by the total utility for 
existing customers (denoted by 𝑘), along with any new customers that would be drawn in by 
the technology (denoted by 𝑛). The utility is denoted by 𝑢 and the cost by 𝑐. The cost of 
offering this technology is not additive, but rather a function of the total customers, 𝐾 and a 
set of other factors including network effects and product synergy, 𝜃. 
𝜋𝑖(𝑄𝑖) =  ∑(𝑢𝑘,𝑖(𝑄𝑖) − 𝑐𝑘,𝑖(𝐾, 𝜃))
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ ∑ (𝑢𝑛,𝑖(𝑄𝑖) − 𝑐𝑛,𝑖(𝐾, 𝜃))
𝑁
𝑛=𝐾+1
 (1) 
This increase in total utility is driven by the change technology has on the service or 
product used, which customers value in a normally distributed manner. Moreover, customers 
will have a valuation for growth in service quality (e.g. throughput, latency, reliability) that is 
part of the network slice, in different ways, depending on the service. Each customer can 
have its own way of valuing the service, and we’ll model the valuations as either step-wise, 
27 
 
flat or constant functions. For the bidder, the aggregation of these demand curves generates 
their valuation for this service, what they stand to gain from bidding for the network slice. 
The bidders report their valuations for their assigned 𝑄𝑖 to the orchestrator, denoted as 
𝑣𝑖. As shown in equation (1), their total utility is formed from the perceived utility gain of 
both existing and new customers or businesses from gaining the network slice, compared to 
their current situation. This is simplified into the form of equation (2), with different utility 
levels with and without the guaranteed QoS of the network slice. Critically, the efficiency of 
the system should be based on the valuation that they hold for network slices, rather than just 
the QoS they are seeking. Even if bidders seek identical or near-identical network slices, their 
valuations for these can be vastly different. 
𝑣𝑖(𝑄𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖(𝑄𝑖) − 𝜋𝑖(0) (2) 
 As an example of how a bidder formulates its valuation based on its underlying 
demands as in equation (2), we will look at Dorsch et al., who analyse the economic benefit 
that comes from SDN communications on a network slice for smart grid communications 
(Dorsch, Kurtz, & Wietfeld, 2018). Smart grids are electricity grids that counter a more 
fluctuating energy production and consumption flows with distributive applications, 
connected with ICT solutions, in this case a network slice. The driving factor in using an 
SDN solution is its ability to guarantee hard service guarantees for the critical services in the 
distribution grid of the network and by enabling OPEX savings in the transmission grid, 
outperforming legacy networks within 4 years. Moreover, the competitivity of the technology 
comes necessarily from sharing resources with other end-users through having one of many 
network slices, rather than having a dedicated cell network.  
 An SDN-controlled network can provide a more secure and reliable operation of the 
smart grid than a legacy network, but the traffic itself is pre-planned and constant, and 
therefore the demand for high variation capability in the network is limited. Traffic is 
classified between priority-random (𝑐𝑝), regular (𝑐𝑟), and scheduled (𝑐𝑠) (column 5 of table 
1), with most of the services with a random or regular function being of small packages, 
needing a guarantee against package dropping. The scheduled traffic can be shifted in time 
flexibly, and thus the network is unlikely to need a spike in network services for any of the 
larger packages being sent. Moreover, the customers of the electricity companies are unlikely 
to have a larger valuation for a better smart grid infrastructure that wouldn’t impact their 
personal quality of service, i.e. how they receive electricity to their homes. 
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The authors expect the aggregate data rate per connection to grow over time, creating 
a need for more resources reserved for their network services, and thus likely to generate a 
step-wise demand function for the network slice over years. Under our bidding mechanism, 
the smart grid operators would only bid for a 𝑄𝑖 that would cover the current network needs 
during the allocation phase. In the re-allocation phase, they would seek to meet their higher 
data traffic with additional resources, specifically the scheduled traffic, 𝑐𝑠, which is flexible 
in time but needs far greater resources (see column 2 in table 1). This paper thus gives an 
example of a model bidder for our mechanism design: they have a well-defined need for a 
network that varies in their capacity needs, which is improved by being operated as a 5G 
network slice. They form their valuation based on the better service guarantees and OPEX 
savings that the slice provides them. 
 
Table 1: Smart grid communication needs. Source: Dorsch et al. (2018)  
 So, let’s look at the strategy that the bidder should implement in our market, which 
seeks to maximize the profit that comes out of their network. To do this, I base my work on 
(Maskin & Riley, 1989).  First, let’s model the revenue so that the network slice only finds 
value from the resources allocated if they generate the minimal QoS demanded, i.e. reaches 
the lowest isoquant line given in figure 6. Critically, the seller cannot force a bidder to 
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purchase a network slice, hence there needs to be a selling procedure in place. There, each 
action is a pair of QoS and price {𝑄𝑖, 𝑚𝑖}, and bidder 𝑖’s strategy maps their type 𝑣𝑖 to 
actions, as 𝑠𝑖(𝑣𝑖) = {𝑄𝑖, 𝑚𝑖}.  
We’ll denote the strategy the bidder 𝑖 chooses as 𝑠𝑖, with the other bidders adopting 
the strategy rules: 
𝑠−𝑖
∗ (∙) ≡ [𝑠𝑖
∗(∙), … 𝑠𝑖−1
∗ (∙), 𝑠𝑖+1
∗ (∙), … 𝑠𝑛
∗(∙)] (3) 
As a non-cooperative game, bidder i’s profit is affected by both its own optimal strategy, 𝑠𝑖
∗, 
and the optimal strategy of all other bidders, 𝑠−𝑖
∗  . The strategy of each bidder is a series of 
pairs, with a network slice, 𝑄𝑖, tied to a payment 𝑚𝑖. Since we want to simplify our 
calculations, we will formulate this pair in a deterministic form: we assume deterministic 
strategies, and thus rule out the randomization of actions. The strategy is a best-response to 
other players’ strategies, thus we won’t take subpar strategies into account when pondering 
the bidder’s type. We can therefore note this pair as: 
[?̂?𝑖(𝑠𝑖
∗, 𝑠−𝑖
∗ ), ?̂?𝑖(𝑠𝑖
∗, 𝑠−𝑖
∗ )] (4) 
 We must also note a few key assumptions that must be made for the Maskin and 
Riley’s mechanism to be incentive compatible. Firstly, we must assume a non-decreasing 
price elasticity: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑣
(−
𝑞
𝑑
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑄
) ≤ 0. This implies that absolute risk aversion with respect to 
consumption is non-decreasing in their valuation. Also, we will choose a parameterization for 
which the increases in demand price are non-decreasing as 𝑣𝑖 increases, 𝑚22(𝑄𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) ≤ 0. The 
combination of these two assumptions creates a reasonable expectation for a market like ours: 
that both the demand elasticity and valuations of the bidders are non-decreasing, as long as 
their individual rationality, 𝑈𝑖(0,0) ≥ 0, is respected. 
 The valuations firms hold for a potential network slice is based on the combined end 
user valuation change for their services with the network slice (equation 1), since this is what 
drives their profits. Thus, in a market mechanism where company bids would be proportional 
to the network slice would have on its product’s efficiency or increased value to its 
customers, the allocation of the resources would be to those companies that would generate 
the most utility out of them. To understand why bidding truthfully is optimal, Maskin and 
Riley consider the expected surplus of a bidder that has their valuation 𝑣𝑖, but bids something 
else, 𝑥𝑖. Thus, the bidder 𝑖 of type 𝑣, with a total of N bidders, expects a utility, 𝑈𝑖, of: 
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𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) =  𝐸𝑣−𝑖[𝑁(?̂?𝑖(𝑠𝑖
∗(𝑥𝑖), 𝑠−𝑖
∗ (𝑣−𝑖)), 𝑣𝑖) − ?̂?𝑖(𝑠𝑖
∗(𝑥𝑖), 𝑠−𝑖
∗ (𝑣−𝑖))] (5) 
where 𝑁(?̂?𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) ≡ ∫ 𝑝(𝑧, 𝜎𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖)𝑑𝑧
𝑅
0
, meaning that we assume the cumulative distribution 
function of valuations for each resource to be strictly increasing and continuously 
differentiable. Simplified, we assume that for each separate resource, 𝜎𝑟, the probability, 𝑝, of 
being allocated the network slice strictly increases with the valuation, given all other 
resources valuations are constant. Next, we can suppress the strategy functions to define 
𝑄𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑣−𝑖) = ?̂?𝑖(𝑠𝑖
∗(𝑥𝑖), 𝑠−𝑖
∗ (𝑣−𝑖)) (6) 
𝑚𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝐸𝑣−𝑖?̂?𝑖(𝑠𝑖
∗(𝑥𝑖), 𝑠−𝑖
∗ (𝑣−𝑖)) (7) 
Then, we can rewrite (5) as 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) =  𝐸𝑣−𝑖[𝑁(𝑄𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑣𝑖), 𝑣−𝑖) − 𝑚𝑖(𝑥𝑖)] (8) 
Since the surplus is built on the expected actions of other actors within the markets (𝐸𝑣−𝑖), the 
bidder knows that they cannot unilaterally change the market behaviour. They thus know that 
given other bidders are choosing strategy based on their demand, they must choose the 
optimal strategy too, or face getting a suboptimal amount. It then follows that, for all i and 𝑣𝑖, 
𝑈𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) = max
𝑥𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) . (9) 
 To generalize what we’ve learned from Maskin and Riley, a mechanism only induces 
true valuations, 𝑣𝑖, from a bidder if this is their best response, given that other bidders are 
playing according to their truthful strategies. Further, for the mechanism to induce 
truthfulness from all bidders, providing a truthful valuation must be the Nash equilibrium for 
all bidders, which requires that all bidders that gain something out of the mechanism must 
hold a nonnegative expected utility (Myerson, 1981). This nonnegative utility is driven by the 
information that the bidder holds, and which the orchestrator needs to create an efficient 
allocation. This comes in the form of an information rent, the value of the private information 
each bidder holds, which Myerson shows to be the integral between a non-truthful and 
truthful valuation (Myerson, 1981, p. 17). This means that each bidder with an accurate 
valuation is rewarded by the mechanism, giving them cause to be truthful even when the 
orchestrator has no knowledge of their valuation type. I have thus shown that our market 
would be a Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible mechanism. 
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 Since we know that the bids placed by firms for network slice resources is driven by 
the efficiency or additional customer willingness-to-pay, and that the bid itself maximizes 
firm profit by matching this increased demand with the amount of resources bid for, we can 
now know that the bids themselves will be efficient in the market. Due to the truthful bidding 
of all bidders, we can create a socially efficient allocation mechanism. In Maskin and Riley 
(1989), this is driven by a single price in the market, since the multi-unit product being 
divided is competed on by all. In our case, however, a solitary price is not possible to enforce 
effective allocation, given that the unique combination of resources required means that the 
price charged of each bidder can be unique as well. We will look into this at section 4.3.1. 
4.2.2. Creation of the Network Slice 
 
 Now, we will look at stage 1 from the figure 5, how the sellers provide resources to 
the orchestrator. Given that the market consists of multiple different multi-unit resources, the 
sales process is more complicated than in Maskin and Riley. Therefore, we need to figure out 
a model for how the cost of each network slice is structured with respect to the object of the 
mechanism being combinations of resources, so that we can quantify what is being bought 
and sold. The easiest way we can characterize the costs on the input-providing firms is to 
model all these inputs as a group of vectors, with pairs of input and output vectors for each 
product on offer. A combination of input vectors, resources in our case, creates an output 
vector, or a network service in our case, that can be combined with other output vectors to 
form a full network slice, 𝑄. Critically for the orchestrator, it seeks to minimize the inputs it 
has to put into generating this 𝑄. Thus, the multiproduct minimum cost function for the 
network slice is: 
𝐶(𝑦, 𝑤) =  min
𝜎𝑟
{𝑤 ∙ 𝜎𝑟: (𝜎𝑟, 𝑦)  ∈  𝑄} = 𝑤 ∙ 𝜎𝑟
∗(𝑦, 𝑤), (10) 
where 𝜎𝑟
∗(𝑦, 𝑤) gives the minimum input vector, 𝜎𝑟, to achieve the desired output vector 𝑦, 
given the factor prices, 𝑤 (Panzar, 1989). Panzar creates a regularity condition for this 
function, as the technology set 𝑄, which Panzar defines as 𝑇, is a “nonempty closed subset of 
R × Y”, where R and Y are the compact sets 𝜎𝑟 and 𝑦 respectively are drawn from. It 
includes two additional properties: i) (0, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑄 if 𝑦 = 0 and ii) if (𝜎𝑟 , 𝑦) ∈ 𝑄, (𝜎𝑟1, 𝑦1) ∈
𝑅×𝑌, 𝜎𝑟1 ≥ 𝜎𝑟 and 𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦, then (𝜎𝑟1, 𝑦1) ∈ 𝑄. Property i) shows that positive outputs 
require positive inputs, and ii) proves that the production process is at least weakly 
monotonic, i.e. an increase in input must at least weakly increase the output (Panzar, 1989). 
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This framework is useful for our market: each bidder seeks a specific sort of combination of 
output vectors into a multiproduct package, its network slice. It wants to achieve its desired 
minimum requirements, and the seller seeks to meet these requirements with the minimal 
network, storage and computation resources to achieve the Quality of Service, with the 
orchestrator creating these combinations as a proxy. 
 Meanwhile, the seller is generating a collection of output vectors, or network 
resources in our case, that it seeks to sell on the market for network slices. To do this, they 
have their own cost function in providing these resources to the market. Let’s say that the 
firm is producing 2 of the 3 output vectors on this market, 𝑦1 and 𝑦3: 
𝐶(𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3) =  𝐹
13 + 𝑐1𝑦1 + 0 + 𝑐3𝑦3 (11) 
The firm has both fixed costs and production costs, which we’ll now assume to be linear for 
the sake of simplicity, although this would likely be a more complex cost structure for a real-
world firm. The core thing here for our mechanism is the differentiation between fixed costs 
and running costs: although these would drive the prices the sellers offer on the market, this 
will need to be designed into a total cost at different quantity levels. 
 Combining with the isoquants we saw in figure 6, we can see the basic structure of the 
optimization problem the orchestrator faces in figure 7. Here, we see the isocost function 
given in equation (10) seeking to minimize the usage of resources for the seller to produce the 
requires QoS level that the bidder requests, the isoquant. This optimization, with more 
numerous inputs and simultaneous requests, is what the orchestrator is trying resolve. 
 
Figure 7: Orchestrators isocost function seeking to minimize resources while 
meeting the minimum isoquant of the bidder  
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 With this information, the orchestrator must then generate the network slice for the 
winning bids, according to the service requirements that the bid is tied to. The most practical 
way for this is the slice creation being operated by the MNO whose spectrum and C-RAN 
resources were won by the bidder, along with the 3rd party resources that form the other 
network services. This allows for the topology of the network slice to be integrated with the 
other network slices operating under the network resources of that MNO, thus guaranteeing 
the isolation of the slices. Thus, both the buyers and sellers provide their valuations for what 
they seek to buy or wish to sell through the same medium, bundles of output vectors in the 
form of network services combined into a network slice. Sellers list exactly what resources 
they are willing to put up for sale, and this forms the market that we need to allocate to the 
bidders that have their private valuations for the services these resources can provide. 
4.2.3. Seller Strategy 
 
 Finally, we will look at stage 3 of figure 5, looking at how sellers make resources 
available to bidders, and their limitations. The question of how exactly sellers will be 
compensated by the mechanism is outside the core questions of allocation I want to explore 
in this thesis, and thus lies mainly outside its scope. We can assume that the sellers have 
some compensation scheme agreed upon with the orchestrator by the start of the network 
slice creation, thus this interaction has no effect on the orchestrator’s decisions. Still, it is 
important for us to define the role that the seller can and cannot play within the mechanism 
for the market to stay functional. 
For the resource seller, the market mechanism allows for a more efficient allocation of 
excess resources from their own businesses. The opportunity cost for the resources is usage in 
their own business, such as the MNO using their network resources, such as their spectrum 
and C-RAN capacity, on their own eMBB business. A faster connection and higher 
throughput have value to their customers, but there is a strong diminishing return for these 
resources (Oughton & Frias, 2018). With SDN- and NFV-enabled resource-sharing, resource 
owners can allocate their resources to users that have a higher utility, and thus valuation for 
the resource. The seller will seek a minimum price for their offered resources that at least is 
higher than the utility it provides in their own business. The seller will demand a price for its 
marginal resource that is higher or equal to the marginal utility of the resource for its own 
businesses, linked either to the cost efficiency gain or willingness-to-pay of their customer. 
Crucially, this minimum price must be fixed over time, rather than fluctuating based on the 
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current best price for the firm. Such a market would make the resource allocation unstable on 
the lowest instantiation level, such as with the minimum price demand above the agreed 𝐼𝐿0 
cost of a bidder. As mentioned, this thesis will not focus on the transactions between the 
orchestrator and sellers, but there’s an inherent question of who holds risk in the market 
between these two that could be subject for future research. 
If the seller could withdraw its committed resources from the market, the 𝐼𝐿0 of all 
bidders cannot be guaranteed, meaning that the valuations of the bidders would have to take 
this risk into account, potentially making the market mechanism untenable. Since there is no 
stability with the allocation of resources, the incentive rationality constraint of the bidder is 
broken, if they value a null allocation to the sub-optimal allocation, 𝑥. 
𝑈𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) > 𝑈𝑖(0,0) > 𝑈𝑖(𝑥, 𝑣𝑖) (12) 
A decrease in resource availability pushes the price of the marginal network service up, given 
no change to the demand for these network services. Once a suboptimal allocation breaks the 
incentive compatibility of the marginal network slice through the budget limit being hit, their 
valuation of all other resources drops to zero as well. A network slice without the ability to 
perform the services sought from it has no value to its owner and would cause a withdrawal 
from all the other resources. Thus, dynamic minimum price alteration could make the entire 
mechanism unstable for other sellers and the value generation to the bidders’ customers 
uncertain, making the entire market mechanism untenable. A settled minimum price that can 
only be altered at set times of renewed allocation phases removes the uncertainty of dynamic 
minimum price setting, without locking sellers into the mechanism at a fixed price that would 
change ex-ante behaviour. 
4.3. Allocation Phase 
 
4.3.1. Mechanism Design 
  
 In this section, we will go through the allocation phase, where the orchestrator takes 
the network slice demands that the bidders have and creates prospective network slices for 
them to bid on, finally creating the network slices that maximize the network utility with the 
resources made available by the sellers. We will briefly go through how the design part of the 
market mechanism would work, before we look at what the ex-post optimal allocation phase 
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would look like. This allows us to look at what we are optimizing the network towards, and 
how we can achieve something close to it in an ex-ante setting. 
 The problem we are designing for is specifically a multi-unit market with nonidentical 
resources being sold. Each bidder is seeking a combination of nonidentical resources from the 
orchestrator to create a network slice, based on private information. Thus, an Ausubel multi-
unit auction is incompatible with our problem, specifically due to the necessity of 
nonidentical resources being combined (L. Ausubel, 2004). Rather, my starting point is going 
to be the design of nonidentical object multi-unit mechanisms offered by (Krishna, 2010b). I 
will reword Krishna’s example to fit our parameters. The model defines a finite set of 
resources on sale, 𝐾 =  {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, … }, with 𝑁 buyers. Each bidder 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 assigns some 
valuation 𝑣𝑖(𝑆𝑖) for each subset 𝑆 ⊆ 𝐾, which are packages of resources, a network slice in 
our case. We will suppose that 𝑣𝑖(∅) = 0 and if 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑇, S is a subset of T, then 𝑣𝑖(𝑆𝑖) ≤
𝑣𝑖(𝑇𝑖). This gives us that participation in itself has no value to the bidder and that all resource 
valuations are nonnegative. The orchestrator then creates an allocation of all the resources on 
offer (𝑆1, 𝑆2, … 𝑆𝑃) into 𝑃 packages, with the requirements that (a) every resource must be 
allocated to a bidder, and (b) no resource is allocated to more than one bidder. Note that 𝑆𝑖 is 
similar to 𝑄𝑖, in that package 𝑆𝑖 gives the bidder a level of QoS just like 𝑄𝑖 does. However, I 
will show why pre-packaging like 𝑆𝑖 is a suboptimal way of allocation in the next section. 
With all bidders reporting valuations for the packages, the orchestrator allocates the 
packages. An allocation rule is efficient if, for every bidder valuation 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉, the allocation 
𝕊(𝑣) maximizes social welfare over all allocations, so 
𝕊(𝑣) ∈ arg max
〈𝑆1,𝑆2,…𝑆𝑁〉
∑ 𝑣𝑖(𝑆𝑖)
𝑖∈𝑁
 (13) 
The payment a bidder pays for a network slice is based on the externality on the other 𝑁 − 1 
bidders by their presence in the bidding mechanism. Effectively, their payment is the 
difference in social welfare when they bid 𝑣𝑖, rather than 0. I will look further into this 
mechanism through this section of the thesis. 
 In our specific case of mechanism design, Krishna’s proposed VCG mechanism for 
efficient allocation and network slice price, as well as the vector formulation of the individual 
packages, is the right starting point that I will work on from. However, I believe that the 
menu-based design of these subsets or packages that Krishna proposes is incompatible with 
our specific market design, and thus must be worked around. I will first go through the 
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incompatibility, before giving an alternative mechanism to package creation that is built on 
existing computer science literature. I will show that this alternative maintains the truthful 
direct mechanism that the VCG mechanism would require, while solving the issue of 
tractability inherent when creating network slices. Thus, my mechanism would be in line with 
the current literature on nonidentical object mechanism design. 
4.3.1.1. Issue with Menu-Based Allocation 
 
 Myerson lists two levels of uncertainty regarding the valuation of a bidder by the 
orchestrator and other bidders: preference and quality uncertainty. These would be the 
uncertainty of knowing the bidder’s personal preferences to the object offered and the 
uncertainty of the bidder having special information on the intrinsic quality of the object 
respectively (Myerson, 1981). In our case, preference uncertainty relates to the orchestrator 
not knowing what kind of a network slice the bidder values, while quality uncertainty relates 
to the underlying value of the network slice itself. The orchestrator wants to coax this 
information out of the bidder, while the bidder wants this information to stay private from the 
other bidders and will only give the orchestrator this information if they gain from this. This 
second point relates to information rent: the bidders that win in the mechanism want to be 
rewarded for their information by surplus from the market. Thus, they are only willing to 
share private information, shed light on the two uncertainties, if they gain from it. 
 This is the opposite that any revenue-maximizing orchestrator would want to do: the 
orchestrator would want to create network slices to all bidders at prices that would leave them 
no surplus. However, this would require information that the orchestrator knows exactly what 
the bidders value and by how much, and a menu structure would not coax this information. 
By a menu structure, I refer to the orchestrator giving the bidders a list of options of network 
slice structure, a combination of distinct resources in a network topology, at a fixed price. 
The bidder would then browse through the menu and pick the option that maximizes their 
utility, without ability to negotiate on the content or price of the packet. 
 The next problem the orchestrator faces is specifically regarding the infinite 
combinatorial options that it has for the network slices. It has limited information at the start 
of the market mechanism on what combinations the bidders would want, and what 
combinations create value in a network slice. Thus, the preference uncertainty of the 
orchestrator might mean that the created network slice options would fit the bidders poorly, 
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causing the created options to be less valuable to the bidders, and thus to the orchestrator. If 
the orchestrator were to ask the bidders for this information, the bidders with the most 
accurate private information might fear losing this information to other bidders, and thus give 
information with little value to the orchestrator. 
In the end, a menu design would face a trade-off between efficiency and tractability of 
the options. Given that the orchestrator could create near infinite options of network slices, 
with marginal changes in resources from one to the next, each bidder could theoretically find 
the optimal network slice from this list. However, the bidder would firstly have a difficulty in 
finding the optimal network slice from this list. Not only the task of finding the right option, 
but also since the bidder can only poorly translate their network demands into a bundle of 
resources. Thus, the bidder will make sub-optimal decisions without the orchestrator’s help. I 
will look into how the orchestrator supports this in the next section. But more importantly, 
the orchestrator would still be uncertain on what the price of this optimal network slice would 
be. Even if the bidder were able to find the right network slice option, the orchestrator would 
need to coax a valuation from the bidder, without a mechanism to do so. The orchestrator 
might thus end up giving the right network slice at a much lower price than they could. The 
core problem here is that the bidder’s price is dependent on their valuation, and thus they 
have an incentive to be strategic with their bid. 
 Moreover, the combination of these two uncertainties is important: if bidder 𝑖 finds 
out that bidder 𝑗’s valuation, 𝑣𝑗 , is very low, they will assume that bidder 𝑗 has some private 
information regarding the quality of the product (Myerson, 1981). If bidder 𝑗 knows its 
private information to hold value, i.e. that it knows something about the intrinsic quality of 
the network slice others don’t, it would seek to protect this from other bidders. Thus, even if 
we were to give the orchestrator full knowledge of the bidder valuations to create an optimal 
menu of network slices, the bidder might still wish to avoid signalling this private 
information to other bidders through its decision (Myerson, 1983). The bidder might seek to 
shelter its knowledge and make a sub-optimal choice from the menu to retain the quality 
uncertainty others have. 
 From these points, we can note that the orchestrator is in a weak position to utilize a 
menu-based market mechanism to distribute the resources to bidders. The allocation must be 
based on the private information that the bidders have, thus requiring the orchestrator to 
provide information rent to those bidders with critical private information. Given this 
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information, the orchestrator can optimize the allocation to be efficient based on bidder 
valuations and learn the true value of different combinations to diminish the quality 
uncertainty that exists ex-ante in the system. 
4.3.1.2. Ex-post Optimal Allocation 
 
As mentioned earlier, the solution thus must have both the individual capability to 
influence the package allocated for you as the bidder but would not require conditional bids 
for multiple combinations. This can be achieved using a starting point of service ordering by 
(Ordonez-Lucena et al., 2018), where each bidder provides the orchestrator with what they’d 
be seeking from a network slice (see figure 8). Using this template, the bidder can show the 
orchestrator exactly what they value, allowing the orchestrator to create a prospective 
combination of network services to create the ideal network slice for the bidder. This would 
then be the item they would be bidding for, along with any alternative combinations created 
by the orchestrator as next-best options for the bidder. Examples of this would be creating 
packages with different edge computing resources in urban areas the orchestrator believes 
will be highly contested. Such a pre-planning allows for each bidder to bid for something 
their own optimal product, without valuations affecting what they end up paying and not 
requiring any conditionality in bids. Also, alternatives can be used to minimize the possibility 
of inefficient allocation caused by one highly desired resource skewing the allocation results. 
 
Figure 8: A service template structure. The bidder provides as exact definitions 
of all requirements and their importance to the orchestrator. Source: Ordonez -
Lucena et al.  
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Once all bidders have their network slices and their alternatives designed for them, the 
next stage would be the valuations for these network slice templates. Each bidder is free to 
value each alternative they have of the templates as they wish, with the safe knowledge that 
their valuation is private and that their valuation is separate to the end price they’d pay for a 
package. As shown in section 4.2.1 and equations (3-9), the mechanism is Bayesian-Nash 
incentive-compatible, and thus the valuation will be truthful, given truthful bids by all other 
bidders. The orchestrator collects all the bids of the individual network slice templates 
offered and starts forming combinations of network slices. The orchestrator seeks to create 
the most valuable combination possible from all the bids, i.e. an allocation of the available 
resources in such a way that it maximizes the total valuation of the network slices within the 
network. This way the mechanism not only guarantees that the bidders winning a network 
slice have a set of resources that is personalized to their needs, but that the end effect is an 
allocation with each winning bid getting the optimal package for them. Moreover, the 
orchestrator can maximize the value of the resources to the sellers by allocating to the bidders 
with the highest valuations. 
 To generate the QoS we talked about in section 4.2, the orchestrator combines a 
basket of inputs from the resources available to it from the sellers on the market. Since 
network slices would value identical resources located in different places differently, we must 
separate each resource instance into its own input. We will simplify the multiproduct cost 
function presented in section 4.2.2 by focusing only on the inputs or individual resources, 𝜎𝑟. 
The orchestrator seeks to minimize the outputs that are created by the inputs (equation 14), 
the main restriction and thus concern is the limited inputs or resources it has. 
𝜎𝑟: 𝑄𝑖 ≤ 𝐹 (∑ 𝜎𝑖,𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=1
) (14) 
∑ 𝜎𝑖,𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=1
= 𝐼 ∙ ⌈
𝜎𝑖,1
…
𝜎𝑖,𝑛
⌉ (14𝑎) 
So, the orchestrator combines resources together to create the desired QoS, meaning 
the network slices can be abstracted into a function of a basket of resources, 𝐹(∑ 𝑖, 𝜎𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=1 ). 
The ratio of each resource that the bidder gets can therefore be defined as 
𝜎𝑖,𝑛
𝑟𝑛
= [0,1]. 
Critically, the bidder does not know or care what the inputs within its network slice are, it 
only cares about the QoS it can gain, as well as its cost. The orchestrator collects all the QoS 
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valuations of the prospective network slice owners, the bidders, to set up the combinations it 
must create the network from. Thus, the vector 𝑄𝑖 has different meanings for the bidder and 
orchestrator: the bidder views it as a guarantee of service from the network slice at a specific 
quality, while the orchestrator views it both as a service to the bidder and a bundle of 
specified resources that the bidder would gain if they win. Note that the definition of a 
bidder’s 𝑄𝑖 does not mean that they automatically get this. Rather, this is what they are 
bidding for in the allocation phase, and only gain the network slice and its guaranteed 
resources, if they win in the auction. 
With all the valuations collected, the orchestrator has an optimization problem 
(equations 15-15d) in its hands: it seeks to maximize the utility gained from the network, 
while keeping within the resource limits, with 𝑅 denoting the total resources. 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 meanwhile 
denotes the amount of resource, 𝑟, that is assigned to bidder i’s network slice. Thus, the limits 
for the orchestrator are that the combined allocated resources do not go above the total 
resources on offer, and that all the individual resources, 𝜎𝑟, should be offered at least in the 
amount that is in accordance to the bidder’s 𝑄𝑖. 
max
𝜎𝑟
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
(𝑄𝑖) ( 15) 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
≤ 𝐼 ∙ 𝑅 (15𝑎) 
𝑠. 𝑡 𝐹(∑ 𝜎𝑟,𝑖
𝑅
𝑟=1
) ≥ 𝑄𝑖 (15𝑏) 
𝑅 = [
𝑟1
𝑟2
…
𝑟𝑛
] (15𝑐) 
𝑟𝑛 = ∑ 𝜎𝑛,𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (15𝑑) 
The orchestrator resolves the optimization problem by maximizing the valuation that 
is created on the market, stacking up network slices using the total resources on offer. 
Bidders pay for their effect on the rest of the market according to the Clarke pivot rule: their 
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payment is the difference to the total market valuation from them being and not being 
included, i.e. the effect of bidder 𝑖 on all other bidders (Clarke, 1971). 
𝑚𝑖 = max ∑ 𝑣𝑖(𝑄𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− max ∑ 𝑣𝑖−1(𝑄𝑖−1)
𝐼−𝑖
𝑖=1
 (16) 
 Essentially, each bidder that gains a network slice is taking a network from a rival 
bidder 𝑖 − 1, and thus by maximizing the total valuation between all bidders and all bidders 
save for bidder 𝑖, we are able to value their load on the network. Their payment is precisely 
the total loss of utility that other bidders see from their participation. The pivot rule uniquely 
allows both a feasibly truthful VCG mechanism and to create prices for bidders that are 
seeking vastly different packages from our network. Their price comes from the effect they 
have on the market, rather than from any valuation for a specific resource on offer. 
 For this allocation to be a truthful direct mechanism, we need to prove two 
propositions: (1) that bidder utility is best served by bidding truthfully and (2) the bidder 
values the package created for them the highest. Proving these, we show that the bidder is 
best served being truthful, and to bid for their assigned network slice. 
Proposition 1: Bidder utility is maximized by bidding truthfully, 𝑈𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑣𝑖) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑥𝑖) 
I already showed in equations (3-9) how a bidder has no incentive to bid anything 
other than truthfully, given that this is an optimal strategy for all other bidders as well. We 
can note that the bidder’s utility is improved by the probability of getting the network slice 
rising (see equation 5), with 𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) giving us the conditional probability of winning 
network slice 𝑄𝑖 with a valuation of 𝑣𝑖. Here, it is tied to probability 𝑝𝑖, which captures the 
effect of the expected valuation of other bidders on the valuation of bidder 𝑖 of equation (8): 
𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) = ∫ 𝑝𝑖(𝑣−𝑖, 𝑣𝑖(𝑄𝑖))𝑓−𝑖(𝑣−𝑖)𝑑𝑣−𝑖
 
𝑣−𝑖
 (17) 
This means that the conditional probability of a bidder winning the network slice with 
their true valuation, 𝑣𝑖, is based on both this valuation and the function of all other bidders’ 
valuations.  Thus, the incentive-compatibility conditions of bidder 𝑖 that must be satisfied, 
which (Myerson, 1981) set, are the same as how they are set up in equation (8). A difference 
in notation is that Myerson displays utility in integral form, while Maskin & Riley don’t. 
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In sum, the bidder would have to be better off with a truthful valuation than anything 
else, given that other bidders choose actions according to their truthful valuations. This is the 
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility proven in equations (3-9). For a more formal explanation 
of the incentive-compatibility conditions, see equation (3.5) from (Myerson, 1981). Given 
equation (4) and the assumption that bidder 𝑖 chooses their action, based on truthful 
valuations by others, we can formulate how bidder 𝑖 responds to these valuations according to 
Myerson’s equations (4.5-4.6): 
= ∫ (𝑄𝑖(𝑣−𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) + (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖))𝑝𝑖(𝑣−𝑖, 𝑥𝑖(𝑄𝑖)) − 𝑚𝑖(𝑣−𝑖, 𝑥𝑖)𝑓−𝑖(𝑣−𝑖)𝑑𝑣−𝑖
 
𝑣−𝑖
 
= 𝑈𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) + (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) (18) 
Thus, connecting this to equation (8), and assuming that 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑥𝑖, he concludes that 
utility is driven by the conditional probability of winning a network slice: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) + (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) (19) 
 Using (19) twice (once with the valuations switched), we get:  
(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) ≤ 𝑈𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) − 𝑈𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) ≤ (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) (20) 
Then follows that, given 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) ≥ 𝑐𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑥𝑖). In equation (20), we see the 
basic demand for incentive compatibility to hold in our modification of Vishna: that the QoS 
gained from package 𝑄𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) must always be at least equal to package 𝑄𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑣𝑖). Given the 
assumptions made ahead of equation (5) regarding the demand price never being non-
decreasing with a rising valuation and a non-decreasing price elasticity, the inequality 
between 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖 holds. It therefore follows that a higher valuation improves the conditional 
probability by improving the expected utility of your individual valuation. Thus, follows 
Myerson’s conclusion that the utility gained must be higher, given a truthful valuation, and 
thus we have proven proposition (1). 
Proposition 2: Bidder’s utility is highest on its own assigned network slice: 𝑈𝑖(𝑣𝑖, 𝑄𝑖) ≥
𝑈𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗) 
 Built on the assumption that the orchestrator, as a neutral actor, creates the optimal 
network slice based on the non-quantitative demands the bidder gave to the orchestrator, we 
assume that the network slice created best fits these demands. A suboptimal network slice 
would therefore require strategically misreporting the demand, which is unlikely given that 
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(a) the bidder assigns no valuation to this demand, (b) this demand is not shared to other 
bidders, thus no hazard rate, and (c) this would harm their expected utility, given that they 
don’t know the other composition of other network slices ex-ante, 𝑄−𝑖. Thus, we can assume 
truthful reporting of demand and therefore an optimal 𝑄𝑖. 
Next, we must separate ex-ante and ex-post valuations, i.e. the expected and realised 
utility, of each bidder. Naturally, it is possible that ex-post the bidder would rather have 𝑄𝑗 
than nothing: 
(𝑈𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑄𝑖) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(∅)) (21) 
However, this is only realised after 𝑄−𝑖 is revealed to the bidder. We’ll look into this next 
section as well. Ex-ante, the bidder knows only that it’s expected utility is best served by a 
network slice it’s likeliest to win. Combining proposition (1), we see that the highest 
comparative valuation, thus conditional probability, is gained by bidding on the network slice 
that they designed themselves. This proves proposition (2). 
 On the usage of VCG mechanisms, these mechanisms critically need that the 
allocation is optimal, simply because the payments that the mechanism creates are intractable 
and irreversible (Bartal, Gonen, & Nisan, 2003). The benefit for our mechanism is that 
computational feasibility requires time for the orchestrator to create alternate allocations, 
which is possible in our allocation phase. Additionally, the value of creating personal 
network slices for the bidders to bid on allows for flexibility on what bidders bid for, without 
causing a problem in feasible optimization. The alternative way of creating alternatives, with 
bidders providing offers for separate resources is considered computationally infeasible, 
unless the amount of bidders and resources is small (Nisan & Ronen, 2007). This is supported 
by Lehmann et al., who show that the feasibility of a mechanism is reliant on reducing the 
possible types in the market (Lehmann, Oćallaghan, & Shohman, 2002). However, what 
Nisan and Ronen note is that the bidders consider the market based on the feasibly dominant 
actions available to them: actions that they have knowledge of. They will base their decision 
on this feasible best response, even if there are better strategies that they have no knowledge 
of (Nisan & Ronen, 2007). Thus, the orchestrator can trust that envy-freeness is guaranteed in 
a mechanism, where the bidder has no more optimal option available than the one created for 
them. The only reason for the bidder to lie, according to the authors, is to improve the 
algorithm to create a better result. 
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With the goal of maximizing the valuation of the network, the orchestrator is designed 
to create a market that rewards bidders for finding usages for the resources that provide the 
highest benefit to consumers, seen in equations (1) and (2). As a neutral principal in the 
market mechanism, the purpose of the orchestrator is to maximize the total utility of the 
market and all its participants through the metric of the total valuation. Neutrality also means 
that the orchestrator holds equal weight for the utility of both the sellers and the bidders and 
is willing to diminish the utility of one actor to improve the total utility. The possibility of 
favouritism by the orchestrator for some actor in the mechanism limits their discretion in the 
mechanism. This would drive the allocation process towards nonmanipulable factors like 
money (Laffont & Tirole, 1991). However, such a market would lack the ability to learn from 
previous allocation and re-allocation phases due to lower information rents for bidders, thus 
limit truthful bidding, and in the end would mean a non-optimal allocation during the 
allocation phase. We will look into this in the next subsection. 
On the subject of what each bidder can bid on, it is the best option to keep the 
templates each bidder has been provided as private, so as to limit harmful strategic behaviour. 
The trade-off here is the ability for bidders to make more informed choices and possibly find 
an even better network slice option. However, this can be limited by accurate conversion of 
the template into the bidder’s ideal network slice and by the creation of sufficient alternatives 
that limits the envy that bidders could have for other bidders’ network slice templates. 
Moreover, the templates would become more accurate to the needs of the bidders due to 
social learning over time, as all actors learn more about the value of all the resources 
available. I will talk about this more in the re-allocation phase, section 4.4. 
At its end, the orchestrator allocates all network services so that, given all network 
slices are operational at the same time, all could be serviced at the instantiation level (IL) 
they have bid for. Instantiation levels are the agreed upon Quality-of-service (QoS) levels that 
the network slices are willing to pay for, with exact guarantees on the minimum standards in 
latency, throughput, reliability and such that are created through the resources allocated to 
their network services. This allows them to show what the minimum level of service they’re 
satisfied with is. A good example of this is given in section 4.2.1 through the smart grid 
example presented in (Dorsch et al., 2018). Thus, the service requests bidders provide give 
the orchestrator only a picture of what their demand is, allowing allocation to be efficient. 
The orchestrator simply needs what combination of excess resources network slices are 
willing to pay for, allocating these as a maximization problem. 
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4.3.1.3. Optimising Packages Ex-ante 
 
 As we noted in the previous section, the orchestrator might not achieve an optimal 
allocation of resources compared to the ex-post optimum, based on a lack of information. A 
bidder might have been better off ex-post, had they been given a non-optimal package by the 
orchestrator to bid for in the allocation phase. To make the comparative clear, let’s take an 
example: company X seeks a network slice, which would achieve 𝑄𝑋 with any optimal 
combination of resources. An alternative composition would have all else the same, except 
computation resource B instead of A, which perhaps is in a different location. Thus, the 
latency and strain on the C-RAN resources would be slightly higher, causing the Quality of 
Service to drop to 𝑄𝑋 − 𝜀. For simplicity, the bidder’s valuation would also change to 𝑣𝑋 − 𝜀. 
The competition for resource A is very high, and other bidders have such high valuations for 
their packages that company X would lose with its pair of (𝑄𝑋, 𝑣𝑋), given that it is bidding 
for the package including resource A. Alternatively, there is less competition for resource B, 
and company X would win with its bid of 𝑣𝑋 − 𝜀. Thus, a naïve ex-ante allocation could 
create a situation in which the bidders have lost in the auction, although they shouldn’t have 
in the view of ex-post efficient allocation. 
 A solution is provided by Nisan and Ronen in the form of a second-chance VCG 
mechanism: bidders are able to offer both their truthful valuation and an alternative bid that 
takes to account competition (Nisan & Ronen, 2007). In our version, this alternative would 
offer a slightly modified version of the optimal network slice, such as resource A being 
switched for resource B, as in the previous example. It would be possible to create more 
alternatives for the bidder, obviously tied to computational tractability of the mechanism 
itself, but we will limit our analysis on a two-option model. The orchestrator values 
maximum efficiency within the entire network, and thus might rather give a second chance to 
a bidder with a high valuation, but an optimal package that would be too highly competed. 
This would be based on knowledge that the orchestrator has on bidder 𝑖′𝑠 situation, 
specifically the competition they are likely to face, with knowledge denoted as 𝑏𝑖. Each 
bidder has a type, 𝑣𝑖, under which they are given an optimal network slice, 𝑜𝑖, and a sub-
optimal alternative network slice, 𝑙𝑖. Contrary to Nisan and Ronen’s version, the orchestrator 
is the one that creates these two options based on the bidder’s QoS requirements, and the 
bidder creates their valuations for them. Based on the knowledge the orchestrator has on the 
bidder situation, they create a slice formulation of 𝑄𝑖 = {𝑜𝑖, 𝑙𝑖} (Nisan & Ronen, 2007). Here, 
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the orchestrator bases the alternative option on the knowledge they have on the other bidders, 
and what they are seeking, 𝑜−𝑖. Thus, the creation of optimal and alternative network slices is 
sequential: the orchestrator takes the optimal network slices it has created for all bidders to 
see what resources are likely to be too competitive for bidders, giving them an alternative 
slice that would help them avoid the competition. If the orchestrator were to base its 
knowledge on the valuations for the optimal network slice, bidders would gain information 
on the type of agent of other bidders, thus causing undesirable consequences (Nisan & 
Ronen, 2007).  
 To guarantee the truthful incentives of the bidders within our mechanism, it is key 
that the bidder themselves cannot create the alternative option for themselves. This would 
require them to hold knowledge on other bidders’ valuations, 𝑣𝑖(𝑜−𝑖), which could cause 
both strategic bids from them, as well as a fear of bidding truthfully for all other bidders. 
Moreover, this gives us another explanation why the orchestrator must be a neutral party: a 
seller would have high incentive to guide the most valuable network slices onto its own 
resources. Other sellers must trust the system to neutrally evaluate who uses their resources. 
 The change this does to our mechanism is quite simple: the orchestrator has two 
alternative valuations by the bidders for the two network slices to consider from when 
allocating resources to network slices. The maximization problem the orchestrator seeks to 
solve stays the same, maximizing based on the valuation of bidders, while restricted by the 
QoS guarantees and the total resources on offer. The valuation of each bidder is transformed 
into an array of valuations, 𝑣𝑖 = {𝑣𝑜,𝑖, 𝑣𝑙,𝑖}, with the orchestrator only able to choose a 
maximum of one of these. This is shown by equation (22e), which is added to (15-15d): 
max ∑ 𝑣𝑖(𝑄𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
(22) 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
≤ 𝑅 (22𝑎) 
𝑠. 𝑡 ∑ 𝜎𝑟,𝑖
𝑅
𝑟=1,𝑖=1
≥ 𝑄𝑖 (22𝑏) 
𝑅 = [
𝑟1
𝑟2
…
𝑟𝑛
] (22𝑐) 
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𝑟𝑛 = ∑ 𝜎𝑛,𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (22𝑑) 
𝑣𝑜,𝑖, 𝑣𝑙,𝑖 ∈ {0,1} (22𝑒) 
4.3.2. Allocation of Resources 
 
 Given that the bidders have provided their network service allocation bids and sellers 
have provided their minimum pricing rates to the orchestrator, the allocation of the resources 
can commence. We will go through the orchestrator’s decision-making in allocating the 
network services to the right bidders, looking at how it can be made efficient. We will also 
look at the creation phase of the network slices, leaning on the technical explanations in the 
3rd section. 
 The key questions the allocation phase answers are: who gets what and what do they 
pay? It is critical to remind ourselves about the necessity of conditionality in all the bids that 
potential network slices make: they only find value from a complete network slice, with all 
the network services its operation requires. If, for example, a mobile video gaming network 
slice is lacking the network service that allows computation offloading, it cannot provide the 
latency rates that are needed for the service to function as intended (Mach & Becvar, 2017). 
Thus, the rest of the resources assigned are irrelevant for the network slice, simply because 
the sought-after service cannot be created. In a market where they face the risk of being stuck 
with a partial network slice, bidding would have to be strategic and consider the likelihood of 
bid failure in the value of the bid. Rather, we would want the bidders to freely bid for all the 
network services they seek, knowing that they will only pay if all their bids succeed. 
 To this effect, combining conditionality with the Clarke pivot rule for allocation of the 
network services and the payments that bidders must provide for their network slice does this 
in a way that guarantees truthful bidding. Using a price mechanism like the pivot rule, a 
mechanism in which the valuation creates the allocation but not the pricing of resources, has 
been proven to be effective in pushing bidders to be truthful with private information on the 
value of the bid object (L. M. Ausubel & Milgrom, 2005). The dominant strategy of being 
truthful is subject to assumptions regarding the bidder knowing their private value, not caring 
about the identity of other bidders and what they pay, and that budget constraints must never 
be binding (Milgrom, 2000). The auction design isn’t guaranteed to provide the highest 
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possible payment to the sellers, but can help allocate the network services to the bidders with 
the highest valuation (Myerson, 1981). 
A critical technological concept we need to briefly delve into is punctured scheduling, 
which allows for data traffic of different priorities and latency and reliability requirements to 
operate on the same network (Esswie & Pedersen, 2018; Pedersen, Pocovi, Steiner, & 
Khosravirad, 2018). In its simplicity, punctured scheduling is the way in which more critical 
data transfers are given priority by the virtualized base-station unit for the antenna it operates. 
The current solutions are built on algorithms that decide on the order of downlink traffic 
based on maximizing the transfer rate for eMBB users and minimizing the latency of URLLC 
users. The authors use puncturing to mean more time-critical data slotting into the scheduled 
transmission of another user that is deemed to be less time-sensitive (see figure 9). Thus, we 
are able to not only combine different users into the same network as network slices, but also 
to have different types of usage cases in the same network without an issue of Quality of 
Service requirements being failed. 
 
Figure 9: The basic principle of downlink punctured scheduling. A more time -
critical user (in blue) punctures the scheduled transmission of an eMBB (e.g. 
streaming) user (in grey). Source: Pedersen et al.  
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4.4. Re-allocation Phase 
 
 Once the network slices have been created with the appropriate resources and all 
network services have been integrated together to create functional network slices, each 
network slice would now be guaranteed their minimal instantiation level, 𝐼𝐿0 whenever they 
want to use it. However, the network slices are unlikely to all operate on this level 
simultaneously. Thus, there are resources that are not being used by any network slice and 
could be formed into a network service that some other network slice would value. This is 
something critically missing in current literature on network slicing: they formulate resource 
allocation as a static and one-off action, with network slices guaranteed a certain range of 
performance that they can freely use (Jiang et al., 2017; Ordonez-Lucena et al., 2018; 
Tadayon & Aissa, 2018). Another alternative in the literature is an allocation mechanism 
focused on maximizing network utilization and reducing QoS violations, but without 
mechanisms on allocating resources to the most efficient users (Sciancalepore, Cirillo, & 
Costa-Perez, 2017). Combined, that is specifically what I will seek to add: how to optimize 
the functionality of the network services in a dynamic setting to re-allocate resources to those 
with the highest valuation at each time. The reality is that most network slices need their 
resources at a different time, and at a different intensity. Efficiency comes from 
differentiating the valuation of different service requests, lacking in current literature. 
Therefore, the orchestrator must know where an unused marginal resource should be 
allocated within the market, based on who needs it the most. By re-allocating unused 
resources, we can achieve a higher usage rate for the resources on offer in the mechanism, 
creating more efficiency. An efficient re-allocation would generate more value from all 
network slices and higher welfare for consumers of the networks, without harming the 
isolation or functionality of all slices. 
4.4.1. Mechanism Design 
 
4.4.1.1 Basic Design Structure 
 
To clarify the structure of the re-allocation phase, the phase will be formed into a 
sequence of bidding rounds, where the network services are formed for each round by the 
orchestrator and are re-allocated to the winning bidders. This period could be 30 minutes, 
with windows ending 15 minutes before for bidders to form their next bids, although this 
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suggestion is not fixed. Critically, the usage of network slices can be modelled as partially 
predictable and partially random: there is a certain level of usage that the network slices can 
expect from their end users, while a part of the resource usage is driven by random decisions 
of end users. This of course is reliant on the business model of the network slice: the resource 
demand of a smart grid slice is more predictable than a video stream slice, since its operations 
are more pre-planned.  
We’ll separate between entitled network slices, slices that have a claim to resources 
based on the allocation phase, and re-allocation bidding network slices, slices that are seeking 
to use vacant network services above their own allocated network services. Entitled network 
slices are entitled to their minimal instantiation level of service without taking part in the re-
allocation round, and is prioritized above all re-allocation bidding network slices in each 
round: if they seek to use their network slice at any time, the necessary resources will be 
vacated from re-allocation bidding slices to guarantee their quality service until the limit of 
their 𝐼𝐿0. The re-allocation phase simply seeks to re-allocate vacant network services to all of 
the bidders in the second group during each round of the phase, effectively sharing the 
crumbs that are not assigned between them. 
 
Figure 10: Timeline of a re-allocation phase round 
 For the re-allocation phase, resources need to be packaged in a way that allows for 
competition between network slices in the same auctions, while mitigating the harm of 
conditionality. This is why a mechanism handling each resource individually is sub-optimal: 
bidders would have trouble combining these individual resources together to create the 
service they need. On the other end of the scale, a similar allocation strategy as used in the 
allocation phase, pre-packaging resources into a higher instantiation level of the complete 
network slice (see figure 6), would be infeasible, due to the uncertainty that all resources 
would be available. Since all resources cannot be guaranteed to bidders, due to entitled 
network slices from the allocation phase having a right to these resources at will, the 
packaging loses its value. Rather, a happy middle is found from the orchestrator creating 
bundles that would then be re-allocated and removed according to valuations. 
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Critically, the orchestrator cannot know what the usage rate for resources on its 
networks will be, though it can estimate the demand through previous usage rates. Therefore, 
any pre-packaging by the orchestrator of network services together would fail on the problem 
of conditionality: the failure rate, the likelihood that a bundle is not available throughout the 
re-allocation period, is not the same for all network services for the bidder. The pre-
packaging practiced in the allocation phase would be incompatible with a re-allocation 
mechanism, since bidders would not be competing for the same priority levels with their 
individual packages.  
Accordingly, we would create two categories of bundles: network resources bundled 
either with computation resources or storage resources. All additional operation by a network 
slice above its own minimum instantiation level needs additional network resources to 
accommodate this, and therefore each bundle must contain them. Moreover, by splitting up 
computation and storage resources, we can separate the two broad usage cases for these re-
allocated resources: the creation of over-the-top solutions that require computation power 
(Taleb et al., 2017) and smart caching solutions that require storage resources (Taleb et al., 
2016).  
To utilise the example presented in section 4.2.1. about a network slice for a smart 
grid solution (Dorsch et al., 2018), recall that they had a set of time-critical but small data 
packages that needed to be transferred, as well as much larger, time-flexible packages. While 
its minimum network would serve these smaller packages, it would likely compete for the 
computation and network resource bundle to transfer these larger packages. This bidder 
would likely only bid for these bundles, and would seek to bid for them during downtimes of 
the entire network, such as during the night. It is important to note, however, that network 
slices are not limited in how they can use these bundles: rather than providing them with 
specific network services, we are offering them additional capacity to operate their own 
network services. There can be some variation within the bundles, such as different amounts 
of spectrum and C-RAN resources to create variation in provided bandwidth, throughput, 
delay and reliability. This would allow bidders seeking resources for time-critical or 
reliability-critical services to value resources differently, without causing a fragmentation of 
the auctions themselves.  
Bidders are not limited from bidding for any of the bundles, but realistically they are 
only going to compete for bundles within their own network: for example, a computation 
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bundle with both network and computation resources that are from the same sellers they are 
currently receiving resources from. Accordingly, the bundles would be formed underneath 
these market structures: the orchestrator would seek to bundle resources together as much as 
possible to allow bidders to compete for bundles available in their own network. Although a 
network slice could use a re-allocated bundle outside its current network topology, they 
would face issues in connectivity, such as the application programming interface (API) that 
the applications operating the resources use. By comparison, a bundle already under the 
network slice’s network would simply be re-allocated by the SFC operator within 
milliseconds. The trade-off here is the possibility of demand mismatch: concurrent 
overdemand and oversupply of the same type of bundle due to the difficulty to re-allocate 
resources. However, the re-re-allocation of resources wouldn’t face difficulty, making the 
solution technologically feasible.  
Each bundle can be produced for a finite amount of times, but each instantiation of the 
bundle would be produced on different underlying physical resources: during downtimes for 
network slices there would likely be a lot of resources available to create these bundles, 
compared to a time of high demand. In other words, the critical part of competition here 
would be priority: who gets a re-allocated bundle and whose bundle would be re-re-allocated 
to an entitled network slice when they demand it? Here, we can borrow from internet 
advertising auctions and generalized second-price (GSP) auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky, & 
Schwarz, 2005). For each competed bundle, bidders provide bids, denoted as 𝑏𝑖, for priority 
slots that are assigned in decreasing order of bids. Each bidder is allowed to offer a single 
valuation for a bundle. There are 𝐶 slots available, with 𝑁 bidders competing for them: 𝐶 =
{𝑠1, 𝑠2, … 𝑠𝐶}. A key design is to have more bidders than available slots, 𝐶 < 𝑁. Each bidder 
that wins a slot pays the bid directly below them, i.e. the winner of slot 𝑠𝑛 pays 𝑏
𝑠+1. 
The higher up on the priority list, the less likely the bundle will be re-re-allocated 
from you, and therefore more valuable the position is. Contrary to the concerns in sponsored 
ad usage that bidders might not value slots as a strictly increasing function due to 
clickthrough rates being affected by the user, we do not have this concern. Since the only 
effect on valuation between 𝑠𝑛 and 𝑠𝑛+1 is the expected probability of using it ex-ante, we 
can assume incentive compatibility, as proven in equations (17-20). Each time an entitled 
network slice uses its network again, the bundles their slice uses is taken from the bidding 
network slices that are lowest on the re-allocation priority list (see figure 11). For example, if 
the resources were formed into 100 equal bundles, we’d see that the 101st ranked bid in figure 
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11 would never receive any bundle. Moreover, if entitled network slices were using 40% of 
the resources, the 61st ranked bid would be the first losing bid. 
The value of such an allocation mechanism is that it does not require any specific 
usage of the network to work: priority levels allow for a division of the vacant resource, no 
matter how much of it is available at any moment, with variation only in the number of 
winners in re-allocation. The payment of each bidder is dependent on how long they were 
able to utilize the bundle: if it was re-re-allocated away from them halfway through the 
round, for example, they would only pay for half of their bid. Moreover, a mechanism like 
this allows for a grace period of the payment being contingent on continuous availability 
beyond a minute, for example. This prevents questions of incentive compatibility, where a 
bidder is paying for resources that are constantly given and pulled away from them, causing 
payment but barely any usability. So, a bidder that only receives a bundle seven times for a 
10-second period each would not pay for this. The ideal grace period would require further 
investigation of the technological limitations and is thus outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Figure 11: An example of GSP ordering of bids – all bids above the utilization 
rate would gain an allocated bundle at each point in time  
In order to run the dynamic re-allocation, the mechanism needs a system that can 
dynamically redirect the service function path (SFP) of a user within a virtual network, so 
that the orchestrator of the network can re-allocate resources to a network slice seeking claim 
to its minimal instantiation level from other users in real-time. SFPs are the routes that data 
packages take through a virtualized network service in the network topology (Medhat et al., 
2017). This is the core function of a service function chaining -solution (SFC), creating a 
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management model that makes the routing decisions for a network (Halpern & Pignataro, 
2015).  
There are several SFC solutions that are possible to use, all differing in how they 
implement the chaining, that are evaluated in (Medhat et al., 2017). The authors look at how 
the control and data planes are managed by the software, and how good the flexibility and 
scalability of the software is. Flexibility is defined as “the efficiency of the traffic steering 
scheme implemented in the SFC solution” and scalability is based on “the number of rules 
needed to apply traffic steering for one chain”. In our case, both are important, but having an 
efficient traffic steering scheme is paramount to us. For our usage, (Csoma et al., 2014) 
provides us with the best possible flexibility with a dynamic pathing solution in its ESCAPE 
tool, and thus would be what our re-allocation would be based on. I will not go into detail on 
how the software paths traffic, as this would go outside the scope of this paper, but for us the 
critical part is the software’s ability to dynamically re-allocated resources within its own 
network in milliseconds, based on given policies. These policies would be based on 
maximizing the utility of the mechanism. Combined with the punctured scheduling explained 
in the allocation phase, there is a technological capacity to re-scheduling and re-path data in a 
way that allows for re-allocation to function. 
 
Figure 12: Example of two service function paths through a network service with 
Virtual Network Functions and Virtual Links. Source: Medhat et al.  
 
4.4.1.2. Extension to Basic Mechanism 
 
 Conditionality is still a crucial problem within each bundle, even given the GSP 
mechanism, since bidders seek different levels of service. Video streaming services that serve 
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a larger population like Netflix have demand for a vastly larger bundle, compared to a smaller 
service that offers video conference services for a few companies, for example. Thus, while 
the smaller company would only bid for one instantiation of the bundle, Netflix would want 
to bid for multiple instantiations. A solution offered by (Dimitri, 2018) creates a 
Combinatorial Generalized Second-Price (CGSP) auction, where bidders can either bid for 
one or multiple sequential slots. Sequential bids mean that the issue of only a part of the 
network services the bidder bids for being allocated to them is minimized, although it causes 
some inefficiency from the GSP auction requiring all bidders to make one bid. There is a 
possibility that a bidder seeking three units of the bundle loses, although their valuation for 
two units would have been high enough to win. However, the trade-off from a more feasible 
and understandable bidding system for the network slices is worth this slight inefficiency. 
As in the current literature, the price for position 𝑠𝑛 in the list is the bid 𝑏𝑛+1, as a 
general rule. However, with the CGSP auction structure, this is made more complicated with 
bids for a package of bundles amongst the single bids for priority: bidders are competing for 
the same item, but in different quantities. The general rule is still kept in place in the 
combinatorial GSP auction by Dimitri: the valuation of a package should be higher than the 
combined value of other bidders seeking the positions of the package (Dimitri, 2018). So, 
let’s look at a market with three slots and five bidders, one seeking both positions and the 
four others seeking only one slot, with valuations for those single slots of 5, 7, 8 and 9, 
respectively. Here, the bidder seeking the package would need to have a valuation of 17 or 
higher to win the first slot. The bidder pays the higher option between either the combined 
single slot bids or the next highest equal package. If bidders have equal valuations, the 
orchestrator would randomly allocate the slots 𝑠𝑛 and 𝑠𝑛+1 between the package bidder and 
the highest single slot bidder. If the package-seeking bidder has a valuation of 16 or less, this 
would mean the package wouldn’t get first slot. Dimitri offers two options in terms of 
allocation here: either the highest single slot bidder wins the first slot and the comparative is 
done between the package and the 2nd and 3rd highest single slot bidder (notated as CGSPa), 
or then both the 1st and 2nd highest single slot bidders get the first two slots (notated as 
CGSPb). A comparative example is given below: 
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Table 2: Comparing slot allocation with CGSPa and CGSPb. Source: Dimitri 
(2018) 
 What we can see from table 2 is a competition for seven slots with six bidders, one of 
which is seeking what the author calls an image, a package of two consecutive slots. With a 
valuation of 17, the package is less valuable than the combined bid of players 2 and 3. In 
CGSPa, player 2 gets the highest slot, and the comparison is again done between the package 
and the bids of players 3 and 4, where the package is valued higher to give player 1 slots 2 
and 3. In CGSPb, this second comparison is not done, but rather players 2 and 3 gets slots 1 
and 2, and the package is compared against the bids of players 4 and 5, where the package 
bidder wins to get slots 3 and 4. So, although the rules rely on similar principles, they can 
produce somewhat different results. 
4.4.1.3. Pre-planning of the Market 
 
The demand for higher performance can be driven by either push or pull effects, just 
like in the allocation phase. The first group would be one with a constant demand, where 
higher performance has no additional value, and thus they are not willing to pay for more. 
We’ll call this group constant demand bidders. Demand can also be driven by a network slice 
perceiving value from a higher instantiation level, with the key being a predictable 
performance. They have their valuations for additional resources driven by firm-level demand 
for higher performance, which is tied to the time the resource is available. We’ll call these 
bidders in the re-allocation phase fixed demand bidders. The third variant will have higher 
instantiation level requests being pushed by customer demand, such as a surge in network 
activity in a certain area. This demand is a more dynamic one, since the demand cannot be 
pre-planned, but can only be estimated. We’ll call this group dynamic demand bidders. We’ll 
look further into these bidders in section 5.2, discussing network composition. 
A system in which a bidder can seek out resources whenever they wish would be 
computationally irretractable, simply because of the constant fluctuations that would cause 
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constant recalculation of the re-allocations. A more realistic mechanism would be based on 
scheduled valuations for pre-designed bundles that would potentially become available, based 
on the network services that are left unused by other network slices on their minimal 
instantiation level. This is critical: the complete pre-packaging used in the allocation phase is 
untenable due to the uncertainty of what resources will become available. Alternatively, 
creating separate bidding for individual resources would create too large an exposure problem 
to the bidders from the conditionality of the bids.  
For such a market of bundles, the network slices would have a clear understanding of 
what they would get, and thus there would be the ability to plan and schedule bids for these 
bundles. Even the dynamic demand bidders, such as streaming or video communication 
services, can fairly accurately estimate the future demand for their services in terms of when, 
where and how much their services will be used. There is a need for estimation of demand 
that means that over- and underbidding for resources happens, but this would diminish over 
time with the services becoming better at predicting usage by their customers. More 
importantly, this is a trade-off worth taking, with the computation by the orchestrator being 
less strained and now tractable, while the largest harm to the network slice would be the 
necessity of scaling down services slightly when they have underbid. 
One of the core things the sellers in the mechanism seek is the ability to maximize the 
value of their provided resources. This means that the network should have as high a 
utilization rate as possible, along with those most willing to pay always being offered 
resources. The bidders meanwhile want a system where they can always be assigned 
resources when they have demand for it, but not to lose it if they value it heavily. Finally, the 
orchestrator is designed to make the market as efficient as possible, with bundles constantly 
being allocated to those that value them most, creating as much surplus as possible. 
4.4.2. Downscaling and Re-re-allocation 
 
 A key part of the proposed mechanism is the guarantee that the Quality of Service 
agreed upon in the allocation phase is always available to the network slice until its minimal 
instantiation level, and this still needs to be guaranteed throughout the re-allocation phase. 
Thus, any entitled network slice must always be able to utilize the package that they won 
during the allocation phase, and those underlying resources need to be returned. This requires 
downscaling the resources allocated to at least one of the winners in the re-allocation phase, 
and the weighted proportional fairness criterion dictates that this should happen to the bidder 
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with the lowest valuation (Afèche, 2006, p. 110). Thus, the priority list is used as the driver of 
re-re-allocation: the orchestrator simply takes the lowest valuation winning bidder for each 
bundle that is now returned to an entitled network slice and passes their bundles on. 
 Downscaling brings another benefit for packaging vacant resources into bundles for 
re-allocation: the impact of an entitled network slice reusing its resources can be contained 
into the bundles that their usage takes up, without limiting any other re-allocated bundles. 
The entitled network slice is provided with resources that guarantee the Quality of Service 
that they won in the allocation phase, meaning that the impact on re-allocated bundles is 
limited, if there is a limited usage of the entitled network slice. Critically, we limit the impact 
of a more conditional package, and how this would need to be downscaled. The trade-off 
naturally is the conditionality that some bidders have for the bundles that they bid for during 
re-allocation, but the harm is more limited when they still have their minimal instantiation 
level that is guaranteed to them. Bottlenecks will be formed due to re-re-allocation, but the 
network slice is still capable of operating.  
 On a technological level, downscaling of resources will operate in the same way that 
it is done in the opposite direction during re-allocation: the entitled network slice demands 
resources for its operations, thus triggering a need for downscaling. The management and 
orchestrator (MANO) plane (see figure 4 and section 2.4) of the resources that need to be re-
re-allocated redesigns the pathing of the concerned network slices within its own networks, 
increasing the resources allocated to the entitled network slice and vice versa. Here, the value 
of virtualized resources comes to the forefront: this dynamic re-allocation happens in 
milliseconds, or as soon as the MANO plane can decide on its re-pathing decisions. The 
entitled network slice does not face any buffering in utilizing its package, and thus doesn’t 
have any disutility in participating in a market including re-allocation. 
4.4.3. Bidder Valuation 
 
A key thing for us to note is that not all bundles available would be ideal for each 
bidder, and thus their valuation would be based on the realized service, rather than simply 
their demand for service. A CDNaaS (content distribution network as-a-Service) bundle that 
is on the opposite side of the country than where the customers of all streaming network 
slices are would have little value to those network slices, even if they would be seeking extra 
resources. A CDNaaS is a combination of network and storage resources, that allow on-
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demand access to stored data in data centres, e.g. a Netflix user gaining access to a TV show 
that is stored at a data centre. Alternatively, a computation warehouse with excess 
computational resources would be of little value to a network slice that is seeking more 
storage resources, and thus their valuation for the available network service would be low.  
We thus have to understand how exactly bidders would value an excess network 
service, since this understanding allows us to tailor the bundles on offer more exactly to the 
bidders and to develop the allocation process through social learning. Better understanding 
would allow the mechanism to allocate and re-allocate more efficiently, creating greater 
value from the same resources. Moreover, not all bidders can compete for all the bundles 
available: the underlying resources would need to be a part of their network topology to be 
usable by the network slice itself. As an example, being allocated more C-RAN resources is 
only valuable if they are underneath the same MNO that the bidder’s network slice is on. This 
limits the competition within each bidding for network services, but is a necessary part of the 
way network slicing works, and thus cannot be avoided. 
The next thing we will seek to do is answer how bidders evaluate the value of excess 
bundles added into the re-allocation market, and subsequently how much they are willing to 
pay for them. This is driven by internal calculations of what the entailed resources can do to 
improve performance and customer satisfaction with their service. As an example, given that 
a data centre has more excess storage capacity on offer for re-allocation than computation 
resources and these were packaged up together, this would be more valuable to network 
slices seeking for higher CDNaaS capacity than one seeking TOFaaS (traffic offloading as-a-
Service) capacity, which allow selectively offloading traffic off a network to lighten its load 
(Taleb et al., 2016). Moreover, with the value in CDNaaS coming from the ability to cache 
popular content, such as a hit show on Netflix or HBO, the streaming services would likely 
seek to respond to local push demand for certain content with bigger caches of data (Taleb et 
al., 2016). Each network slice will have different demands from the excess resources they 
seek, and thus have different valuations for them. In effect, this means that the re-allocation 
market will likely have network slices competing on a wide range of bundles. 
 For a feasible system, the bids that the network slices offer in the re-allocation phase 
must be offered in advance of the excess resources becoming available. Such a combinatorial 
auction would have too many types of bidders to be computationally feasible, especially 
given the running-time that we seek to enforce in this situation (Lehmann et al., 2002). We 
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thus make a trade-off of a slightly suboptimal solution for the re-allocation, in exchange for 
the ability for the mechanism to run in real-time. So, the bidder herself has to give a pre-
planned value for any resource that becomes available for bidding in the re-allocation phase. 
Next, we will look at the factors that would drive this decision. Effectively, the valuation of a 
network slice for an available bundle on offer is based on how close to their ideal sought 
network service it is. The closer to the optimal network service the offered network service is 
for them, the closer their valuation is to their optimal valuation. 
𝑣𝑖(𝑄𝑖) = 𝑣𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙[𝑤𝑐(𝜃𝑐) + 𝑤𝑠(𝜃𝑠) + 𝑤𝑛(𝜃𝑛)] (23) 
𝑣𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 = max
𝑄𝑖
𝑣𝑖(𝑄𝑖) (24) 
The bidder has an optimal valuation that is based on their demand for a bundle that 
would exactly provide what they need, i.e. the most they are willing to pay for exactly what 
they want. In reality, the bundles available would likely not be perfect for any bidder, and 
thus all bids would be a part of this optimal value. The bidder has values 𝑤𝑐, 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤𝑛 for the 
weight of computer, storage and network resources respectively within the bundle they are 
seeking. Each type of resource has its own set of coefficients, marked by 𝜃, that are private 
information on how the bidder values performance, quantity and quality measurements of the 
bundle. Although bidders’ ex-post utilities from a re-allocated bundle are linked to the 
likelihood of winning and how long they have the resources, this does not affect their ex-ante 
valuation of the resource, and thus their bid itself. 
 Now, let’s look at some of the coefficients bidders would have for different parts of 
bundles. This isn’t intended to be exhaustive or provide monetary values for bidder valuation, 
rather to give the reader an idea of what sort of things bidders value. First, a bidder has 
different valuations for excess resources based on the time they are available. A network slice 
that connects the sensors within a factory complex together, for example, would value excess 
computation and network resources more when the factory is at full production, rather than 
when it is on minimum capacity. They can plan a schedule for their connectivity needs, 
which would be tied to the value they place for excess resources that would allow this. Even a 
customer-demand driven network slice like a streaming or video service would have 
estimated needs, and thus valuations, for excess resources that could be scheduled for the re-
allocation phase in advance. Additionally, since temporal requirements are not equally 
critical to all network slices, a re-allocation mechanism would incentivize the usage of 
cheaper resources during off-hours for those that are flexible time-wise. 
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 Next, the location of the resources, and thus the ability of the bundle to only provide 
services in a fixed area, is valued by all bidders. This is especially true for network slices that 
seek CDNaaS services, as talked about earlier, who might have increasing demand in specific 
areas. Regionally operating network slices would also find a network service that is available 
on the wrong side of the country valueless. On the opposing side of location is the coverage 
that a bundle can improve their current services in. This is only relevant for network 
resources, such as the C-RAN resources available, which have a certain area that they can 
cover. Again, the locality of some network slices is going to limit their valuation to resources, 
likely meaning that C-RAN resources in a bundle in urban areas will likely be valued much 
higher than those in identical bundles in more rural areas. 
 Another set of coefficients that bidders will be concerned about is the performance of 
the network service they’d gain from the bundle, such as the effective throughput, latency and 
reliability of the underlying resources. Latency, for example, is partially defined by the 
physical distance between the user equipment and the edge computing resources, but also by 
the performance and load of the computation resource (3GPP, 2018) and the C-RAN resource 
connecting to it. The bidders may have either a constant valuation for better performance of 
their network slice, or they may have a certain cut-off point for the performance of a network 
service. Thus, it is likely that bidders will have vastly different understandings and valuations 
for the performance a bundle can provide. 
4.4.4. Revenue Efficiency and Equilibrium 
 
  To understand the equilibrium that is formed within the priority list, it is useful to 
think of each bidder’s situation in the form of up-Nash and down-Nash from (Lucier, Paes 
Leme, & Tardos, 2012). Up-Nash is when a bidder can’t improve its utility by taking a slot 
above it on the list, while down-Nash means that they can’t improve their utility by taking a 
slot beneath them on the list. Bidders that get a slot on the list must satisfy both up-Nash and 
down-Nash conditions, while bidders that didn’t get a slot must satisfy the up-Nash 
conditions (Lucier et al., 2012). Moreover, a set of bidding functions is a Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium, if for all bidders, expected utility is highest by bidding truthfully, so 𝑏𝑖, not 𝑏′𝑖: 
𝐸[𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖(𝑣𝑖), 𝑏−𝑖(𝑣−𝑖))] ≥ 𝐸[𝑈𝑖(𝑏
′
𝑖(𝑣𝑖), 𝑏−𝑖(𝑣−𝑖))] (25) 
 We must also briefly look into the information conditions that apply in our 
mechanism. In the GSP literature, the main consideration is between a Bayesian partial 
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information game, where bidders know their own valuations and only that other bidders are 
picked from independent and identically distributed valuations, and a full information model, 
where each auction is played repeatedly with the same group of bidders and the bids stabilize 
due to repeated play (Caragiannis & Kaklamanis, 2011). Clearly, our bidding game is 
somewhere in between these two settings, but closer to a full information game. Online 
advertisement auctions are based on constantly changing keywords, bidder preferences that 
may vary significantly over time, and advertisement quality scores that match ads that 
customers will be more receptive towards (Caragiannis & Kaklamanis, 2011). In our game, 
the bundles on offer will have little variation over time, bidder preferences are more stable 
and predictable over the long run, and the priorities would only be based on valuation. So, 
although the bidders cannot know the valuations of their competition, they will have a good 
estimate of the other bidders as a collective, especially over time. Thus, we will model the 
behaviour of the bidders based on a full information game.  
This also brings us to the question of reserve price: should the orchestrator seek to 
improve the revenue through a minimum price in the mechanism? Here, a reserve price 𝑟 
means that any bidder with value 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑟 would be dropped, after which the GSP mechanism 
would then be run. A reserve price would not serve any necessity to cover costs, since the 
underlying resources would still need to be constantly available to the entitled network slices, 
and the operating costs for the SFC software necessary for dynamic re-allocation is 
diminishingly small. The classic Myerson argument for a reservation price, that the 
orchestrator should rather keep the item on offer to themselves than give it to an 
“infinitesimal” small bid (Myerson, 1981), is tough to achieve when the desired 
“appropriately chosen reserve price” is hard to define. However, using one in an experimental 
setting has been found to improve the revenue of a GSP auction (Edelman & Schwarz, 2010; 
Ostrovsky & Schwarz, 2010). This experimental setting was built on the Generalized English 
Auction, with the rising prices offered by bidders, and seems to be designed to force the bids 
of bidders upwards via the reserve price. This would imply that their bids without a reserve 
price are below their true valuation, going in conflict with the truthful valuation mechanism 
of second-price auctions, and thus is perhaps a bit outside my thesis scope. Such 
determination would require empirical research. 
 (Edelman et al., 2005) and (Varian, 2009) have shown that the full information game 
always has a pure Nash equilibrium, and that this equilibrium has the same outcome and 
payments as a VCG mechanism, the comparative mechanism to a GSP auction. In the 
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comparative, unlike a VCG mechanism, a GSP auction does not have an equilibrium in 
dominant strategies and does not have truth-telling as an equilibrium either in a Bayesian 
game, when there is incomplete information (Edelman et al., 2005). Edelman et al. classify 
this category of equilibrium as envy-free equilibria: bidders do not prefer any other bidders’ 
position in the mechanism ex-post. Critically, the value of an envy-free equilibrium is that the 
bid profiles are always efficient and the revenue is always greater than or equal to the VCG 
revenue (Lucier et al., 2012). 
 Another question we need to answer is the harm that comes to a bidder from the 
bundle they have won in a re-allocation round being taken away from them. This would 
happen if re-re-allocation was necessary to provide an entitled network slice resources, which 
would require the lowest valuation re-allocation bidder to lose their bundle. If the bidder 
loses a lot of utility from seeing their resources taken away from them by a higher bid before 
the end of the round, then they face a hazard rate they take into account for their ex-ante 
valuation. Were the individual rationality of the bidder be disrupted, i.e. not bidding at all 
having a higher utility than losing the resource halfway through the round, then the bidder 
would not wish to take part in the phase or might push them to bid strategically. A part of the 
harm is mitigated by the technological design of the mechanism: since the re-re-allocation of 
resources is done by software within the same network, the entitled network slice will see no 
change in service, thus removing this possible harm from the problem. However, the bidder 
in the re-allocation is definitely affected. 
 This hazard rate is driven by an ex-post valuation that the bidder holds: knowing that 
they might not get excess resources for the entire re-allocation phase might affect their 
valuation ex-ante. This might cause strategic behaviour, in that bidders would bid lower than 
their true valuation for the bundle. The mechanism of the re-allocation phase is uncertain in 
the resources it provides by design: even the highest bid might not get any resources, since all 
entitled network slices might want their resources at the same time. Bidders that want 
guaranteed resources beyond their minimal instantiation level would bid for a bigger network 
slice in the allocation phase, and would not take part in the re-allocation phase. However, as 
long as the up-Nash and down-Nash requirements of the equilibrium are met, hazard rate of 
losing a bundle is no problem. A bidder with this uncertainty would not hold envy for any 
position above or below them ex-ante, but only ex-post when the uncertainty is realised.   
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4.4.5. Social learning by orchestrator 
 
 With each round of subsequent allocation phases after the original round and its re-
allocation phase, the orchestrator is better able to understand the value that resources, and 
their packaging, have on the market utility gained. The substructure of each MNO’s network 
can also be optimized to maximize utility in the following re-allocation phase, even if it 
causes lost revenue in the allocation phase. A constant higher demand for a certain resource 
within the re-allocation phase can also be used as a signal by the sellers to increase their 
capacity to profit from the higher demand. 
 Given that bidding based on your true valuation is a weakly dominant strategy in a 
second-price auction (Vickrey, 1961), the orchestrator is better able to understand the value 
of the resources on the market, based on the bids that are placed during re-allocation 
offerings. The actual valuation equations used by the bidders themselves is still private 
information, but the outputs that they yield for the re-allocation phase allow for the 
orchestrator to better understand what sort of bundles are perceived as valuable, thus what 
combination of resources is valued. At its core, the early network service offerings are based 
on heuristics and a pre-network slicing understanding of the market, centred around the 
service templates that all bidders provided for the allocation phase. Over time, the ability to 
collect truthful bids for a collection of bundles that would be forced to variate due to 
fluctuating availability of excess resources means that the orchestrator is able to track when 
and why bids went up and down during re-allocation. 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Fairness, Efficacy and Efficiency of Re-allocation 
 
 A re-allocation mechanism is both different to the commonplace in resource 
management, as well as instinctively unfair for seemingly re-using resources that have 
already been allocated to some actor in the market. Without a clear understanding why this 
sort of a mechanism is useful, has limited downsides, and is ultimately necessary, it is hard to 
justify the use of dynamic re-allocation. To do this, I will consider the value of the efficiency 
trade-off from adding more computation work for the mechanism in exchange of a higher 
usage rate of resources, thus showing the efficacy of the mechanism. Moreover, I will also 
look at why the re-allocation mechanism requires the allocation phase before it for the market 
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to function fairly and effectively. To be clear, there will naturally be some bidders and sellers 
in the market that would benefit more from a static allocation mechanism, but I will show 
that their loss in the market is fair in that it fulfils the weighted proportional fairness criterion 
(Afèche, 2006). 
 The definition of a system’s efficacy is that the intended result should be achieved: for 
us, the intended result is that at each point in time the available resources are allocated to 
those users that value them the most, to the best of the system’s abilities. Thus, the system 
shouldn’t be measured on its achieved allocation efficiency ex-post, but rather on the 
decisions made being the best possible ones ex-ante. Here, the allocated resource should end 
up with those that value them the highest in both the allocation and re-allocation phase. 
Although our system cannot guarantee this ex-post, such as in cases of a bidder arriving late 
for a re-allocation phase with a higher valuation, but the ex-ante valuation ranking in both 
phases guarantee that those with a higher valuation than the current marginal bidder never 
lose out. Furthermore, as was shown by (Maskin & Riley, 1989) and in equations (3-9), the 
bidder has no incentive to lie about their valuation. Thus, the valuations are the best 
responses bidders have for the resources on offer, and though these valuations might change 
or be inaccurate, this still satisfies the efficacy of the system ex-ante. 
 A question of efficiency can also be asked regarding a possible change in valuation 
between static and dynamic allocation: whether or not bidders change their reported valuation 
due to the system. Critically, when compared to a static allocation model like the one offered 
by (Ordonez-Lucena et al., 2018), the valuation of receiving their minimal instantiation level 
on both systems is the same. The key differences come from the way resources above the 
minimal instantiation level are valued: are they pre-defined during the allocation phase, or are 
they decided upon during the re-allocation phase. In Mierendorff’s work on dynamic Vickrey 
auctions, he notes the issue of bidders and varying valuations arriving over time, as well as 
their ex-post participation constraints (Mierendorff, 2013). The latter one regards a bidder 
with an infinite negative utility if their ex-post payoff is below zero, i.e. they lost out in the 
bidding process (Ollier & Thomas, 2013). Critically, in a bidding process like network slicing 
will create, where the bidders have unclear understanding of how much they value network 
slice, they seek to avoid this negative payoff at all costs. Thus, a system that allows them to 
value their minimal participation and to bid for higher performance dynamically minimizes 
the hazard rate of overvaluing resources. Moreover, as Mierendorff notes, dynamic allocation 
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allows for the orchestrator to seek out the bidder with the highest valuation, and thus 
maximize the efficiency of the network (Mierendorff, 2013). 
 Next, let’s briefly touch upon the technological efficiency of the re-allocation 
mechanism. The operation of dynamic re-allocation mechanism requires both the constant 
availability of all resources on the network and the operation of the dynamic SFC model 
suggested in this paper (Csoma et al., 2014). However, with the requirement of resource 
availability in the alternative static allocation model, due to the guarantee of bundles to each 
slice provided (Ordonez-Lucena et al., 2018), the re-allocation mechanism does not have any 
significant effect on cost in comparison. There is a cost in a virtualized resource being active, 
as opposed to idle, but this seems both intuitively small and is outside of the scope of this 
thesis. On the cost of the SFC model used, the authors of the model have based it on an 
OpenSource language and it can be run on any generic hardware, and therefore we can 
assume that the extra cost for the sellers in our mechanism for operating this tool are likely 
outweighed by even a small increase in resource usage and thus revenue. 
5.2. Ex-post MNO Network Composition 
 
 The problem with a naïve allocation of network slices to the network resources of all 
participating MNOs is the conflict of efficiency between the allocation and re-allocation 
phase: the allocation phase might cause the re-allocation to be less efficient ex-post than 
another division at the original allocation level. As an example, this could mean that one 
MNO’s network slices all use their network services heavily from midnight to noon but have 
a low network service valuation for the other half of the day, and vice versa for the network 
slices of another MNO’s network. Ex-post, we would want to split the network slices between 
these two networks to allow higher instantiation levels to be ran by all network slices. Also, a 
poor balance of fixed and dynamic demand network slices would mean that the customer 
satisfaction of the network slices would be lower, since some fixed demand slices would not 
have the ability to run on higher instantiation levels, while some dynamic demand slices 
would see their resources being constantly re-allocated away to cause a need for constant re-
scaling of the network slice. 
 Since a solution like this would require existing knowledge of the market operation, it 
is a problem that goes beyond the scope of this thesis but would still be an interesting subject 
for further analysis. The difficulty of creating an algorithm to achieve this is a familiar one to 
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this paper: the mismatch in efficiency between ex-ante and ex-post allocation. The critical 
question for the algorithm that would plan this division would be the expected total valuation 
a bidder will have for the combined allocation and re-allocation phase network slice they 
received. This would require knowledge of previous rounds to make accurate estimations. 
The alternative way of doing this would be heuristics regarding the estimated demand 
structure that each network slice would have during the re-allocation phase. 
5.3. Net Neutrality 
 
 The vision of network slicing envisioned in this paper goes contrary in principle to the 
laws that concern net neutrality in the EU, although the technology behind it does not 
necessarily break these laws. The large concern is the way that prioritization and 
differentiation of network slices might account to discrimination under the net neutrality 
laws, causing a fear that the development of the technology might be hindered by the lack of 
regulatory clarity (Morris, 2018). The intent of the laws are both clear and desirable, but the 
ability for network slices to customize their own network and for our mechanism to divide up 
resources based on the valuations by bidders is a necessary component that makes network 
slicing efficient. In this section, I will look through how the current EU net neutrality laws 
conflict with both network slicing in general and my own mechanism. 
 The crucial differentiation that EU’s regulation and the Body of European Regulators 
for Electronic Communications (BEREC) guidelines make is between internet access service 
(IAS) and specialized service providers (SpS): IAS providers offer users a connection to the 
distribution networks of the internet, while specialized service providers offer other services 
than IAS that is “optimized for specific content, applications or services” (“Open Internet and 
Net Neutrality,” 2018). On one end of the scale, an internet service provider like Verizon 
would obviously be categorized as an IAS provider, while Spotify would clearly be SpS 
provider. However, the issue with network slicing is the customization that is possible under 
the technology, causing uncertainty in which category it fits under. 
 The BEREC guidelines note both that specialized services cannot be used or offered 
as a “replacement for IAS” (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, 
2016, para. 102) or used to circumvent the stricter rules on IAS as a “potential substitute for 
the IAS” (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, 2016, para. 126). 
For the purpose of network slicing, the key component here is that slices cannot act for the 
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sole purpose of internet access, but rather be a vehicle of internet access through some 
application. An example of this would be video streaming: the user is in end effect accessing 
the internet, but only through a specialized service that seeks to optimize the quality of your 
access. However, the regulations refer that SpS provider should provide services “other than 
internet access services” (EU/EC, 2015, sec. 3(5)) and the guidelines that specialized services 
“do not provide connectivity to the Internet” (Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications, 2016, para. 110). These two would then imply that the opposite is true, and 
that network slices shouldn’t be allowed to serve as an access to the internet. Although it 
seems likely these contradictions are only intended to deny the use of SpS to avoid the more 
stringent regulation on IAS and to stop SpS to be used as a proxy for direct internet access, 
this is not yet clear in the text. It is unlikely that any mobile network operator (MNO) would 
allow for any bidder to provide a direct IAS under its own physical network due to its ability 
to cannibalize their own IAS business, while allowing this competitor to pick and choose its 
customer base due to the “as-a-Service” -nature of network slicing (Kotakorpi, 2006; 
Vogelsang, 2017). Therefore, any network slice is unlikely to evolve into this area of service, 
meaning that the regulatory framework only serves to threaten the innovation that can occur 
under specialized services. This section of the regulation would need a resolution that lifts the 
uncertainty from businesses that provide an indirect access to the internet through their 
network slice. 
 The second thing we will look at is the Quality of Service (QoS) differentiation that is 
at the heart of the network slicing value proposition, what the EU regulation calls traffic 
management. The regulation allows for differentiation to take place on the Internet, in a 
limited capacity: “…such measures shall be transparent, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate, and shall not be based on commercial considerations but on objectively 
different technical quality of service requirements of specific categories of traffic. Such 
measures shall not monitor the specific content and shall not be maintained for longer than 
necessary.” (EU/EC, 2015, para. 9) Applied to network slicing, we can clearly see that 
different use cases like VR video content, smart grid solutions and automated cars fit into 
having “objectively different” QoS demands, and thus discrimination between them would be 
within the language of the regulation. Also, the “transparent and non-discriminatory” 
operation of traffic management can be controlled through 5G QoS indicators (5QI), which 
look at the “QoS forwarding treatment” for the QoS flow in areas like scheduling weights and 
admission thresholds (3GPP, 2018). 5QIs allow for network slices and the MNOs to prove to 
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regulators that traffic is not handled differently from the valuations of the system. This 
requires extra costs to the MNO and network slices, but helps show compliance to the 
regulations and thus lessens the uncertainty. 
The more difficult situation arises from understanding the language regarding 
“commercial considerations” not being the basis of decisions, and the differentiation between 
network slices underneath the same use case, e.g. Netflix and HBO. Under our model in the 
creation phase, firms value the impact of a network slice to their business as either the 
demand of its customer and their willingness-to-pay for the service, or the additional projects 
or savings in existing projects (see equation 1). Let us assume that Netflix and HBO have 
exactly the same network request in terms of what resources their network slices need. 
However, the value Netflix customers gain from the service is higher than HBO customers, 
and thus Netflix’s valuation is higher. This could be modelled as Netflix customers accepting 
a higher subscription price than HBO customers for the service under a network slice.  
Now, let us assume that both network slices are seeking more C-RAN resources to 
handle a high customer load and to guarantee latency rates, a key Quality of Service 
measurement for both service providers. All other parameters the same in valuation in the re-
allocation phase, Netflix would naturally offer more for these resources than HBO. This 
could cause a situation where only Netflix gets these resources in the re-allocation, causing 
the QoS of Netflix to be higher than HBO. This would be done partially according to 
“commercial interests”, in that the resource providers would gain more from allocating the 
resources to Netflix rather than HBO. However, it would be transparent in terms of Netflix 
winning based on observable, clear reasons. Also, this allocation would provide the greater 
net social welfare, since Netflix consumers benefit more from the same resources. An equal 
level of QoS is therefore unlikely to be achieved, as well as being an inefficient use of 
resources. The regulatory language would thus need to be clarified on what sort of 
differentiation is allowed. 
(Frias & Pérez Martínez, 2018) looked into the disparity between QoS and the 
guaranteeing of fair competition between “equivalent services of a certain vertical industries” 
with specific QoS that make them specialized services, noting that this requires the 
categorization of the application-layer services. However, the reality is that most of the 
network slices will seek differentiation from each other, even if they are in the same industry. 
Frias and Pérez Martínez agree on this, noting that such services “are in constant evolution 
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and become substitutive in a very dynamic way” (Frias & Pérez Martínez, 2018). Thus, 
there’s a difficulty in trying to define what the fair competition should look like. The value of 
the mechanism described in this thesis is its ability to distinguish the reason for QoS 
difference between different network slices: those that get the resources are the most efficient 
users of the resources given the weakly dominant strategy of truthful bidding. However, the 
aversion against paid prioritisation by the current net neutrality regulation might mean that 
such efficient allocation would be seen as discriminating on traffic on “commercial interests”, 
and thus illegal. The harm of such aversion to efficient allocation is explained well by (Frias 
& Pérez Martínez, 2018): “the potential of network virtualisation… cannot be unleashed 
under a regulatory vision that presumes that best-effort is always best”. Given the 
customization of 5G networks, the best-effort internet is not the best option available, and 
thus requires amendment to be suitable for a future NSaaS world. 
5.4. Herding and Social Learning 
 
An issue with a market mechanism that calls upon principals and agents to provide 
private valuations for the sold resources, especially the bidders that seek to value the 
resources on offer, is the possibility of conforming towards the price signals that other agents 
provide. If the bidders in our mechanism have uncertainty in their own valuation of the value 
of a network service, they might be willing to forgo their own private information for the 
noisy signals that other bidders provide with their allocation and re-allocation requests. 
Especially in a fear of having underestimated the value of a network service combination, 
bidders might end up bidding inefficiently for the available network services, causing an 
information cascade, where bidders end up making decisions independently of their private 
information. If such a situation arises, the decisions made are not based on any valuable 
information from a succession of bids, and therefore there is no social learning. (Vives, 2008, 
p. 200). 
 The value of our re-allocation mechanism is premised on the network slices learning 
about the value of each bundle and the resources within them. We cannot expect the first 
allocation round to provide a fully efficient market, simply because the information on bundle 
value is expected, not realised. With each round of allocation and re-allocation, we are able to 
learn more about what is valuable: the orchestrator can see the change in valuation for 
bundles with different geographical, resource-balance elements. This can be seen as one actor 
in the market finding out previously hidden information, thus changing their private 
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information. If, for example, they found out that the geographical grouping of physical 
radioheads (as seen in figure 13) would be more efficient by organizing them along user 
traffic hotspots like roads, so moving from the red clusters to the green clusters, this 
information would allow them to garner more value out of the bundles allocated to them. This 
information being available to the orchestrator through a change in bidding habits would also 
work as a signal to make the network service packaging more efficient in the next allocation 
round, thus generating more value for the entire market. Moreover, changes in the demand on 
the network slice side can also cause changes in the way network services are bid for. With 
the end user of the network slice better understanding the capabilities of the network, their 
valuation can evolve enough to push the bidder to change their demands to the orchestrator 
for a different way of packaging bundles to be required. We thus see that social learning is a 
valuable tool in the long-term for making the market mechanism better. 
 
Figure 13: Example of more efficient radiohead network service packaging  
 How about a network slice that is the first slice to learn the value of a specific 
combination of resources, or an innovation in efficiency brought about by combining some 
network services? This agent now has private information that it will wish to keep private, 
while reaping the benefit of this information. It will thus want to win the bids for the network 
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services it seeks in both the allocation and re-allocation mechanisms, without other bidders 
understanding the true value of these bundles. Let’s suppose that bidder A has a new 
valuation of 2𝑥 for the bundle 𝐵1, when combined with two other bundles, 𝐵2 and 𝐵3. 
Meanwhile, let us assume that the expected value that other bidders hold for this combination 
is 𝐸(𝜋)~𝑁(0, 𝑥), but the realized value with this combination is 𝜋~𝑁(0, 3𝑥). Thus, under 
the GSP mechanism, bidder A knows that in the first round, any bid above 𝑥 is going to place 
it at the top of the priority list. Since the information rent from this knowledge will come 
from continued undervaluing by other bidders, bidder A has an incentive to hide the private 
information they have.  
Let us look at how the discrepancy of private information can make the bidder make 
strategic bids for the resources. The signal bidder A is concerned about now is the size of the 
bid they provide, thus the signalled valuation on the bundle.  We can model the value this 
information has to other bidders as a value from a normal distribution curve: most 
information will provide value to a part of the bidders. Bidder A doesn’t know the value of 
this information to others but fears higher competition for the network service combination 
she seeks. This is especially pronounced, if the value generated is highly dependent on one 
specific resource, such as a location-specific edge computing service. Using the traffic 
offloading as-a-Service (TOFaaS) example in figure 13, bidder A has private information that 
the green combination on the left is a superior option to any of the red options available. 
When this combination is available during the allocation and re-allocation phases, it will seek 
to win the bid, and given it has a significantly higher valuation for the key network service, 
this would be the efficient option. The orchestrator will use this growing demand to redesign 
the network services, packaging more of them in the green combination, since this is more 
efficient. However, bidder A fears that this signalling by the orchestrator, who can view all 
the submitted bids and seller minimum prices, gives information to the other bidders to 
change their behaviour in the same way. This then makes the bids for the green combination 
more competitive, reducing the surplus bidder A garners from their private information. All 
this might change bidder A’s ex-ante incentives to provide a truthful valuation to the 
orchestrator. 
However, since the past prices are a consistent estimator of the true valuation, prices 
will eventually converge through increased knowledge by other bidders. This information is 
based both on understanding of other bids and of the realized value of a network composition. 
The speed of this convergence is dependent on the amount of informed bidders on the market 
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(Vives, 2008, p. 267). The key mechanism that the orchestrator can use to increase 
convergence in the market is anonymized bid information for each round. This allows for 
bidders to place more weight on the public information from past bids and less on their noisy 
private valuation, thus utilizing the private information of bidder A to understand the true 
value of the combination (Vives, 2008, p. 339). To counter this, bidder A consider 
information leakage in its bids: they will seek to bid when the market is deep, i.e. when noisy 
bids don’t change the prices too much and avoid bidding when it’s not. However, the trade-
off between hiding and bidding at desired moments is going to cause the private information 
to gradually seep into the price (Kyle, 1985). 
5.5. Analysing bidder types 
 
 We briefly looked into the types of bidders that would take part in our market 
mechanism in the creation phase, section 4.2, but we had to make some assumptions and 
simplifications regarding the preferences of bidders to make a functional mechanism. Given 
the market mechanism’s semi-permanent design in allocation and re-allocation, and the 
necessity for the rules of the mechanism to be the same for all, there are bound to be bidders 
that are not ideally served by the design. The fear in creating different levels of rules and 
allocation timeframes is that it incentivizes bidders to strategically identify their types in 
order to classify for different rules. In this section, we’ll look deeper into the different 
alternative bidder types likely seeking network slices from our market, and how we can try to 
serve their needs. 
 Firstly, we need to look into network slice seekers with very periodic valuation, i.e. 
bidders with a need for a network slice on occasions only. These sorts of bidders would want 
to have a network slice to use at times, while not needing it at other times, thus not being 
suitable for the timeframe designed for the allocation phase. The benefit of our market 
mechanism does come from the flexibility of the creation phase during discovery, however: 
the bidder is able to create itself a network slice structure during the allocation phase that 
does not have any resources tied to it. Rather, they have a network topology created for them, 
i.e. what network, computation and storage resources it would use, and how it would use 
them, if it was allocated some resources. The cost of this would therefore only be the costs to 
design this network topology to the mobile network operator. Thus, this group of bidders is 
able to take part in the re-allocation phase of the market mechanism, whenever it needs 
resources for its network slice. It can therefore take part in the market for one week every 
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month, for example, although it would not have resources guaranteed to it under this system. 
This is the main drawback of our system for this type of bidder, although accommodating 
them in any other way would compromise the optimization the orchestrator seeks. 
 Next, let’s look at bidders with a one-off desire for a network service, e.g. the 
telecommunications network created for the Pyeongchang Olympics in 2018. This type of 
bidder does not have any lock-in effects to worry about, the cost of switching that hinders 
changing suppliers due to unexpected price changes, since it is using the network for such a 
limited amount of time (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). However, as with the earlier bidder 
type, the timeframe of the allocation phase is too long. The option of creating a network 
topology that they could utilize during a set of re-allocation phases exists for them, but the 
lack of continued usage would make this less viable. The alternative option within our 
network would be to sublet a network slice from an entitled network slice, but this network 
slice would likely be sub-optimally designed for them. The more realistic option is for them 
to go directly to an MNO to create a private network slice, since this would allow for the 
contractual flexibility that they need, and our mechanism cannot provide.  
 Finally and most importantly, let’s look at bidders with a much longer timeframe they 
require the network slice to be guaranteed than it is in our mechanism. An example of this 
would be a company building a factory and seeking a network slice to connect all its devices 
within the factory together, and to connect the entire factory to its larger network. They 
would seek assurances from the orchestrator for a much longer timeframe than the market 
mechanism can accommodate for, such as 20-30 years. If they cannot get guarantees of a 
minimal instantiation level to lock in their weighted average cost of capital (WACC), the risk 
to cashflow of a factory without the required network slice causing the entire factory not to be 
worth it. The disruption to their business from not having an operative network slice can be 
inhibitive. Specifically, in the case of cloud computing as we have here, the problem of 
vendor lock-in can be severe due to the difficulty in migration from one network to another of 
their applications and data, with possibly incompatible software or architectures hindering 
movement (Opara-Martins, Sahandi, & Tian, 2014). 
This is the most difficult bidder type to accommodate within our market mechanism: 
a bidder seeking assurances for a network slice that might not be optimal in the long-term. 
The solution within the mechanism would come from the valuation of the factory being so 
high that they would gain a network slice throughout the 20-30 years, each time there’s a new 
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allocation phase. Thus, the end outcome would be the same as a guarantee, although there 
would be ex-ante risk for the bidder that they would have to factor into their profitability 
calculations. This would be likelier to work in later allocation rounds, once the approximate 
value of the network slices has risen, mitigating this bidder’s risk. Given a bidder with a 
similar timeframe demand, but with a marginal valuation within the allocation phase, the risk 
involved for them would likely be so high that the investment would not be worth it without 
guarantees. Such a bidder would go against the ex-ante efficiency rule for the orchestrator 
(Mierendorff, 2013), with a higher valuation bidder likely to arrive for the following 
allocation phases to take the place of the factory bidder, thus making the guarantees a sub-
optimal option. Realistically, some of this type of bidder is likely to exit our mechanism 
entirely, seeking their own network slice with dedicated resources, separate from our market, 
rather than bidding for this network slice as-a-Service. However, this type of bidder cannot be 
fully accommodated in our system without creating knock-on effects to other bidders. 
5.6. Market Information Structure 
 
 A critical question that deserves further pondering is the amount of information other 
bidders should have of each other’s bids. On one extreme of the spectrum, the orchestrator 
organizes the mechanism as a black box, where bidders can only share their own valuations, 
and the only information is their own actions, and the collective structure of the market. On 
the other end, bidders would get information after each round on what each bidder received, 
and how much they paid for this. The trade-off from information in a market as nascent as 
ours is the effect that it has on bidders’ valuations: new information may help bidders adjust 
their valuations to be more accurate, but it also disincentivizes truthful bidding for those with 
more certain private information. In this section, we’ll look at what this balance of 
information should be in our mechanism, reflecting on existing literature. 
 During the allocation phase of the mechanism, bidders bid for a network slice 
designed for them, without information on what other bidders are bidding for and what they 
are offering for it. By design, this limits the bidder’s options within the market to the 
alternatives the orchestrator designs in section 4.3.1.2, outside of collusion between bidders. 
For the orchestrator, awareness on all other bids would allow the bidder to practice bid 
shading, reducing their offer from their true valuation (Krishna, 2010a). In practice, this 
could happen in the form of a bidder becoming aware about the lack of demand for one 
network service that their network slice requires. Building on the assumption that the 
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orchestrator designs the optimal network slice and alternative, given the bidder’s QoS 
requirements and the total resource demand, we assume that awareness of the network slice 
structure for other bidders would not make the market more efficient, and thus would have no 
value for the orchestrator to provide. The phase is therefore best kept as a game of incomplete 
information, with bidders reliant on defining a strategy as a best-response to a Bayesian game 
against other bidders. This allows us to rely on the literature of Bayes-Nash incentive 
compatible games and the strategy structures they offer (e.g. Myerson, Maskin and Riley). 
 Besides understanding the bids of other bidders, another key area of information 
concerns the acquisition of information by an uninformed bidder to make their private 
valuation more accurate. One way to model this is for the bidder to have access to statistical 
experiments that would yield further information on their private valuation from a set of 
probability distribution. Given that the orchestrator seeks to create a socially optimal 
mechanism, it is easy to see why the bidders have an incentive to acquire information in a 
socially optimal manner (Bergemann & Välimäki, 2002). Effectively, this would mean a 
mechanism with a costly entry, where bidders gain a private signal about their network slice 
upon market entry (Mcafee & Mcmillan, 1987). If used in our mechanism, this cost would 
not be required for all bidders, but would rather be something an uninformed bidder might 
use. Key here is that the orchestrator itself is not parcelling out information regarding the true 
value of a network slice. Firstly, the orchestrator is likely to have only limited information in 
the first round of allocation in the mechanism. Secondly, any sort of information parcelling 
by the orchestrator would risk mitigating the benefits of a neutral actor, with an entry barrier 
limiting the entrance to the market of smaller bidders. 
As mentioned in section 4.4.4, our re-allocation mechanism is best modelled as a full 
information game, with a market that becomes more predictable in its prices over time due to 
fairly static bundle composition and predictable total demand. Since the re-allocation 
mechanism would be repeated often, the game quickly transitions towards one with full 
information. The differentiation that must be made is between information of what was sold 
for what price, and who won which bundles. The former is information that would be 
impossible but also impractical to hide from bidders, since the orchestrator wants to generate 
social learning between bidders to minimize the risk they factor into their valuations (Vives, 
2008, p. 200). The bidders want to learn about the true value of the bundles on offer, but are 
reliant on information signals it gains from the market, such as the value of winning bids at 
certain points in time. On the other side of the coin, the orchestrator has limited ability to 
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observe the signals that it provides to bidders and the value this information has to them. The 
orchestrator controls the information on the market, but has limited ability to learn the value 
of the information, thus creating the trade-off of information that I’m talking about (Esö & 
Szentes, 2007). There is a greater issue with free-riding when bidders have awareness of the 
winning bids within the market. Since bidders can strategically bid low, and still garner the 
information within the market, the need for collective action in figuring out the true value of 
these bundles is lost. If the “social marginal value of evidence” is pushed higher by forcing 
bidders to bid truthfully to understand the marginal winning bid for a bundle, i.e. at what 
price are they just losing, this information goes to those that need it the most. Thus, the 
market is made more accurate for those bidders that put effort into information collection, 
mitigating the free-riding problem (Li, 2001). 
 The latter option, of bidders learning the identity of winning bidders would create a 
second trade-off: this knowledge would vastly improve other bidders’ private information by 
making information signals less fuzzy, but it would also further disincentivize presenting this 
information, as shown in section 5.4. Given that the information structure in this game is 
dynamic, and that bidders are likely to learn new private information at different rates, the 
revelation of their identity would inhibit them from the acquisition of information. The 
mechanism should seek to reward truthful information with information rent, in order to 
induce a socially efficient system. Even if the ex-post optimal solution would be for all 
bidders to learn from their peers for the most efficient bidders to always win, the ex-ante 
considerations of information acquisition incentives makes it untenable in the long-term. This 
is also the way in which Google operates its generalized second-price advertisement auctions, 
with bidders got given information on others’ identities, only estimated slot positions and the 
average price they should expect to pay (Edelman et al., 2005, p. 6). 
6. Conclusion 
 
To reiterate the core purpose of this thesis, I add to existing literature a dynamic 
allocation mechanism for network slicing that allocates required resources based on the 
valuation that bidders have for these resources, and thus by extension the end user welfare 
created through these resources. Far from intended to be an exhaustive exploration, this work 
creates a new framework that a future dynamic allocation mechanism can draw from. To 
create this comprehensive mechanism, I have drawn on technical works in computer science 
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as a basis for a solution that resolves incentive problems through existing economic literature 
and modified economic theory to suit the technology behind network slicing. The problem 
faced in the network slicing market is one of vastly different requirements for networks by 
bidders that have private valuations for their desired network slice functionalities and an 
uncertainty for the orchestrator of this market on what to offer. The allocation therefore 
benefits from having incentives for truth-revealing in an uncertain environment, limiting the 
ability for a menu-based offering with pre-set prices. Rather, the bidding mechanism should 
make a truthful valuation incentive compatible. 
My designed mechanism starts off with the collection of bidders and sellers into one 
marketplace run by a neutral orchestrator. This orchestrator then takes the requests bidders 
have for their network slice to create individual, prospective network slices based on the 
resources offered by the sellers. Since bidders have such wide-ranging demands for their own 
network slice, any mechanism design that would require bidders to bid for the same packages 
would clash in a trade-off between efficiency and tractability. Also, this way allows us to 
create an allocation mechanism built upon payment through the Clarke pivot rule, 
guaranteeing truthful valuations by the bidders. Finally, we also add a second-chance bid 
extension to the mechanism to avoid individual sought-after resources causing bottlenecks 
that would limit the ex-post allocation efficiency. 
Rather than measure efficiency on the maximization of service guarantees, I have 
extended the existing literature by maximizing the total valuation of the granted network 
slices. Thus, the orchestrator’s role doubles from just maximizing the utilization of resources 
to maximizing the value created by them. Since bidders can create vastly different levels of 
utility from the same resources, it makes sense for the orchestrator to discriminate in favour 
of the value-adding network slices. I further extend this model from one-off static allocation 
of resources to a dynamic allocation mechanism that seeks to use the same value 
maximization principle to resources that are unused in the network. Rather than guaranteeing 
a minimum-maximum range of resources to network slices, the mechanism guarantees their 
desired minimum level Quality of Service, with extra resources bid for through the dynamic 
re-allocation phase. This guarantees bidders what their network slice needs, while allowing 
bidders to seek more resources when they need it. This seeks to maximize the utility created 
within the entire network by minimizing the chance of a network slice that would create high 
utility from its services not being allocated the necessary resources. 
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